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ABSTRACT
Intermodalism is seen by some shippers as a new industry
emerging within the transportation industry. This thesis
provides a basic understanding of the intermodal industry
and investigates how the advent of containerization,
especially the double-stack container system, has affected
the shipper's perception of domestic intermodal
transportation. As the double-stack network spreads there
are signs that this new industry may be able to resolve the
problem of fragmentation which has prevented intermodal
service from becoming cost-competitive. In addition,
containerization and the use of double-stack trains can help
streamline the rapid mobilization of military cargo.
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Today, shifting trade patterns and globalization are
creating new needs for intermodalism. There are new
opportunities and potential profits for carriers that can
provide this dependable, high-quality, value-added service.
To provide this type of service, containerization is the
baton which can be quickly passed from one mode to the next
during transport. Containers are essential and their use
appears to be progressing with technological advances and
creativity. The advent of the double-stack container system
has rapidly expanded in recent years due to improved
technology. As the double-stack network spreads there are
signs that this new industry may be able to resolve the
problem of fragmentation which has prevented domestic
intermodal service from becoming more cost competitive.
This research investigates facts to determine the
contribution of domestic double-stack containerization to
the efficiency and effectiveness of today's intermodal
system.
B. OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this thesis is to acquaint readers
with the intermodal system, and to investigate the double-
sta-' relationships within the intermodal system.
Peripheral issues such as the Intermodal Transportation
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Efficiency Act and military applicability are also
addressed.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The research covers areas of intermodal transportation
and the changes occurring due to the advent of the double-
stack container system. The primary research question is to
determine if double-stack has changed the science of
intermodality. Secondary questions pertinent to the subject
include: Is double-stack more economical than trucks; and
what efficiencies do double-stack container trains provide
operators and shippers.
D. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis is to research and build an
understanding of the emerging intermodal industry and to
investigate how the advent of containerization, especially
the double-stack container system, has affected the
shipper's perception of domestic intermodal transportation
as an alternative to trucks. The scope includes
compatibility i.sues associated with containerization and
the double-stack system. Also, military use of containers
and intermodal systems are briefly discussed.
It is anticipated that the character of this thesis is
general enough to provide thought provoking reading for a
broad audience. However, limitations prevent expanding the
background to encompass a review of the entire intermodal
freight transportation industry. The greatest benefit will
2
be to individuals with some background in container cargo
movements.
E. METHODOLOGY
Data accumulation for the intermodal and the double-
stack network includes a comprehensive review of published
literature with complementary telephone and personal
interviews of representatives in the ocean carrier, ocean
terminal, and railroad companies. Published information are
limited to non-proprietary and unclassified data.
F. ORGANIZATION
This thesis incorporates seven chapters. Chapter II
provides a general overview of intermodal systems with
discussions on the air, land, and ocean legs. Chapter III
discusses the development of the double-stack concept by the
ocean carriers and railroads. Chapter IV describes the
double-stack network and the growth involved. Chapter V
explores the compatibility relationships faced with the
growth of domestic containerization. Chapter VI describes
and interprets the cost factors dealing with the double
stack decision, focusing on the competition between double-
stack and long-haul truck transport. Chapter VII presents a
summary, conclusions, and recommendations.
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT INTERMODAL SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
Intermodalism is seen by some shippers as a new industry
emerging within the transportation industry. Intermodal
transportation can be defined simply as "Through
transoortation movement involving more than one mode (e.g.,
rail, motor, motor-air, or rail water)" with a smooth
transition, thereby, minimizing door-to-door delivery time.
[Ref.l:p.113] A smooth transition between modes of travel
is essential to provide quick and dependable service to
shippers. Today, shifting trade patterns and globalization
are creating new needs for intermodalism. There are new
opportunities and potential profits for carriers that can
provide this dependable, high-quality, value-added service.
Currently, the transportation industry subdivides
intermodal service into two types; domestic and
international. Experts disagree as to which area dominates
intermodalism, but as global markets open up, the
distinctions between the two sectors will blur due to
international and domestic cargoes sharing the same
corridors. "Intermodalism will not continue to evolve
simply as an extension of the container shipping business or
just as an extension of a traditional railroad operator"
[Ref.2:p.58] and, as intermodalism evolves into its own
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industry, there are expected to be great improvement in such
areas as equipment standardization and service quality.
To provide this type of service, the container is the
baton which can be quickly passed from one mode to the next
during transport. Containers are essential in intermodal
transportation and their use appears to be increasing with
technological advances in containers designs and creativity.
In fact, these advances has brought about new potentials in
present intermodal capabilities with the advent of the
double-stack container system (standardized containers are
stacked two-high on special designed railcars) which has
rapidly expanded in recent years due to improved technology
and the opening of new rail routes which have double-stack
clearances.[Ref.3:p.14]
As the double-stack network spreads across North
America, there are signs that this new industry may be able
to resolve the problem of intermodal fragmentation. This
has prevented intermodal service from becoming truck-
competitive. In order to be truck-competitive, the
intermodal firm must meet changing customer needs with both
comprehensive, precise, reliable and timely transportation,
while also providing total logistics management services.
Today, customers des-re flexible, responsive
transportation with matching networks that can take
materials and products around the world, not only port-to-
port but door-to-door.[Ref.4:p.17] These customers also
5
require a true global carrier, one that can move goods
across major intercontinental trade lanes.
This chapter seeks to provide an understanding of the
emerging intermodal industry. We will first investigate the
history of intermodalism, the events and conditions
motivating the adaptation to containerization, and then
build an understanding of how each major container carrying
mode is tied into the intermodal industry. The U.S.
military's progression toward intermodal and the trend
toward container use will then be discussed at the end of
the chapter.
B. INTERMODAL HISTORY
Contrary to popular belief, intermodal transportation is
not new. The movement to settle the American western
frontier along with the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution, gave rise to the development of intermodal
containerization.[Ref.5:p.5] Ferries, for example, have
been available a long time and are known to have carried
boxed cargo, wagons containing cargo, and railcars.
A more significant example was the Pennsylvania Public
Works which was an intermodal system connecting Philadelphia
and Pittsburgh by a system of canals and railroads. The
Pennsylvania Public Works Canal opened in 1839 and involved
the use of barges as intermodal containers. The barges,
loaded with a mix of people and cargo, functioned as
containers as they were loaded as units aboard wagons,
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railroads, and on the canals to provide better door-to-door
service. The carrying structures were canal barges built in
sections. In movements by rail, usually over areas where it
was not feasible to construct a canal, barge sections were
mounted on flat cars and carried to the next
canal.[Ref.5:pp.6-7]
However, when competing with the all-water Erie Canal
and, later, with all-rail routes, it turned out that the
Pennsylvania Public Works system was not cost-effective.
[Ref.5:p.10] Parts of the system were gradually abandoned
and, by the end of the nineteenth century, this early
intermodal system had largely passed into history.
Following World War II, several economic factors
combined to create a favorable environment for intermodal
transportation. One factor was the rapid increase in labor
costs, particularly stevedoring. Another was the explosive
growth in world trade with an attendant demand for faster
and more economical service.
The third factor was the need for cargo security. Even
as early as the 1950's, losses from cargo pilferage were
estimated in the billions of dollars.[Ref.6:p.lll] What
seemed to be needed was a load-carrying structure that could
be easily transferred from one transport mode to another
without the necessity of breaking down and transferring the
cargo.
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With the United States, one method of cargo transport
that became popular at the time was trailer-on-flatcar
(TOFC), or the "piggybacking" of truck trailers on
specially equipped rail flatcars. In June 1960 TOFC was
offered by 51 railroads in the United States and has
continued to grow steadily. TOFC operations were
responsible for hauling nearly 80,000 trailers during the
first 8 weeks of 1960, a 48.6 percent increase above the
same period in 1959.[Ref.7:p.328] TOFC was efficiently used
for highway and rail intermodal transfers and was designed
for land intermodal transport efficiency. However, TOFC is
not as efficient on the land-sea transfer as are containers.
One alternative to TOFC is the Roadrailer. The
Roadrailer used a specialized highway semitrailer with a
pair of steel railroad wheels that could be lowered so the
trailer could ride on railroad tracks as well. The
Roadrailer is an example of "carless" service. A rather
substantial fleet of these Roadrailers was constructed,
mainly to haul mail and parcel traffic behind passenger
trains operating in North Dakota, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.
[Ref.8:p.16] The Roadrailers were first used in the late
1950's behind passenger trains. The Chesapeake and Ohio
Railroad (C&O: a forerunner of today's CSX corporation)
developed this rail-highway vehicle. Their Roadrailer
service lasted until the mid-1960's when passenger train
service was largely discontinued. Because the design was
8
proprietary, it was not picked up by other companies until
the patents were acquired and a more up-to-date version
could be designed.[Ref.9:p.49]
In international transportation, the primary
disadvantage of both TOFC and Roadrailer is that they must
be either driven on or carried on RO/RO (Roll-On/Roll-Off)
ships with relatively high cost and inefficient space use.
There are also delays in the transition time between modes
of transportation.
A new method was needed to cut down on the time it took
to relay the cargo between all modes; air, land, and water.
This need was filled by the creation of the container which




The advent of containerization was a turning point
in intermodalism. The use of containers for ocean cargo and
intermodal purposes was not widely practiced until the 1956
container revolution. Even then, it was quite some time
before intermodal containers were used on all ocean routes
serving the United States. In the mid-1970's,
containerization also took to the air. With the
inauguration of container air service, though limited, the
commercial container distribution system became truly
intermodal.[Ref.9:p.113]
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Containerization proved to have the qualities and
practicality in which smooth transferring of cargo, between
all modes, was possible. The creativity and versatility of
modern containers offered solutions to many problems and
helped in revitalizing intermodalism.[Ref.9:p.51]
2. Advantages of Containers
The driving force behind the development of
containerization as an active transportation concept was the
interest on the part of both shipper and the carrier to
reduce costs involved in the ocean shipment of cargo. By
substantially reducing cargo handling requirements, not only
have cargo handling costs been reduced for shippers, but
port turn-around times have been reduced tremendously for
carriers.[Ref.10:p.18]
Because a container is locked and sealed at the
point of origin and remains so until its arrival at its
final destination, pilferage has been substantially reduced
in situations where past transfers required cargo handling.
Although pilferage does still occur, it can generally be
traced to either the loading or unloading of the container,
rather than during transport.
Cargo damage has been substantially reduced as well.
Although some shoring is still required for cargo loaded
into containers, cargo consignors are better able to mix and
match their cargo to ensure maximum use of container
capacity. The tighter the cargo can be loaded, the less
10
damage that is likely to result from cargo movement in
transit. Additionally, because containers are handled
mechanically, there tends to be less stevedoring damage to
containerized cargo.[Ref.11:p.18] The container also
protects the cargo from the elements.
There are some less obvious advantages to
containerized freight. Containerized shiploading is a great
advance over breakbulk loading in that it reduces time in
port and gives ships more productive time at sea. Since
containers are intact and hold inventory for the duration of
transport, it can also be looked at as warehousing on the
move adding another advantage seen by shippers. Of coarse
the intermodal advantage of containers is that they provide
efficient transfer between modes while facilitating the
unitization of freight.
3. Disadvantages of Containers
The tremendous capital investment required to
support containerization is a primary disadvantage of the
system.[Ref.10:p.19] Because containerization is a capital
intensive industry, relying on specialized equipment, rather
than a labor intensive industry, all participants experience
high start-up costs. Special equipment has had to be
designed and purchased by both ship owners and port
operators for the movement of containers. This equipment,
which must be capable of handling fully loaded containers,
must also have a high degree of reliability when faced with
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the ever increasing numbers of containers moving through the
ports.
4. Containers Used in Double-Stack System
The advent of the double-stack container system has
dramatically altered intermodal transportation. The idea of
double-stack containers has worked well with international
trade but there were many skeptics in domestic
transportation. As late as 1985, railroad officials, with
the exception of Union Pacific, categorically stated that
domestic double-stacked container movements would never
happen in this country.[Ref.10:p.17] The consensus was,
basically, that the stack train was nothing more than "a
flash in the pan" that would never work on a broad scale.
However, by 1990 the number of domestic containers, which
can be double-stacked, had grown to 20,000 units. By 1994,
about 60,000 of these domestic containers are expected to be
in use.[Ref.10:p.17]
Because the use of domestic containerization has
been steadily growing, positive benefits, such as greater
savings, are being seen by both shippers and carriers. With
international trade slowing from the torrid pace of the last
two years, intermodal carriers are battling to recapture
freight now moving over the road. With advancements in
technology and service we can expect freight to be diverted
from strictly highway transportation to intermodal
transportation.
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D. MODAL USES OF CONTAINERS
1. Intermodal Ocean Leg
Ocean shipping was the driving force behind
intermodal transport. This will subside to an extent as the
domestic transportation industry becomes integrated through
intermodal networks. However, the ocean carrier will still
have a major role in the shaping of intermodalism. As more
cargo is containerized, larger vessels will appear in liner
shipping.[Ref.12:p.la] Over the next five years the overall
capacity of the world containership fleet is expected to
grow 25 percent. This growth may result in over-capacity in
the industry.[Ref.12:p.la] U.S. Flag vessels will probably
be most affected should this overcapacity come about, due to
decreasing U.S. Flag participation. Despite an increase in
oceanborne cargo "tonnage" carried in U.S. Flag vessels of
four percent in 1986 and another one percent in 1987, U.S.
Flag participation in liner "service" fell below twenty
percent for the first time in 1986 and dropped further to
14.9 percent in 1987. [Ref.13:pp.12-13] Figure 2.1 displays
this trend.
Containerization has increased port productivity
but, in the mean time, has required increased capital
investment. Investments in the intermodal ocean system
include the containers, the containership, the cranes for
vessel loading, a large container storage area, and








also required to move the containers to and from the
container port.[Ref.16:p.25 1] Intermodal ocean systems
have other options such as RO/RO and LASH (Lighter Aboard
Ship), however, the cubic space utilization is not as
efficient as a container ship.
In spite of the high capital investment required,
liner steamship companies, reacting to shipper preferences,
have invested massively in containerization over the past 20
years.[Ref.14:p.17] Beginning with higher valued cargoes
and working downward, virtually every kind of cargo moving
in liner service became containerized. Military cargo, both
routine re-supply and emergency mobilization stores, have
also become containerized.[Ref.ll:pp.21-23]
In the containership system, cargo maybe loaded, or
stuffed, into a standard-size container at an inland point
of origin. This is usually done at the shipper's warehouse
or plant. The containers are then moved by rail or truck to
an ocean terminal. Finally, the containers are loaded
aboard a containership for movement to an overseas
destination where they are unloaded at a container terminal
and, eventually, loaded on a land carrier for delivery to an
ultimate destination.
The total weight of the container and its cargo are
extremely important due to stability requirements on ocean
vessels. The weight categories are established by the
steamship line to ensure proper control of stowage. The
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container weight is also a concern with respect to the load
carrying capacity of the equipment which will handle the
containers during movement both in the yard storage area and
over-the-road.[Ref.15:p.102]
2. Intermodal Air Leg
Air intermodal is still in its infancy, but it
merits mention. The primary aircraft are the Boing 747F and
the McDonnel Douglas DC-10-30AF all-freight carriers.
[Ref.6:p.113] The 747 freighters or 747 combi-airplanes
with main-deck cargo capability can efficiently hold two
8x8x20-foot air containers side-by-side. However, the
Douglas DC-10-30AF is less economical since containers must
be positioned along the center line, wasting space on both
sides of the container.
The components of the intermodal air system are the
standard ir container, the airplane, the air freight
terminal, and special container-handling equipment for
loading and unloading the airplane.[Ref.9:p.114] Cargo is
loaded in standard air containers and moved to the airport
by a highway carrier, where it is loaded aboard the airplane
for the long leg of its trip. On arrival at the destination
airport, it is unloaded onto a highway carrier for delivery
to the final destination.
Since air carriers are more affected by the line-
haul cargo/container weight than are carriers in other
modes, the standard intermodal air container is a lighter
16
8x8x20-foot box which weighs only about 2,200 pounds rather
than the 5,000 pounds of a standard surface container.
[Ref.9:p.172] These containers are four to five times more
expensive than surface containers due to the specialized
structure and other design elements required to lighten the
total empty weight. However, the intermodal air containers
are more susceptible to damage because of this lightweight
construction. [Ref.9:p.172]
Although these intermodal air containers are
available, most transfer between air and surface modes
usually takes place without benefit of intermodal
containers. Cargo may be containerized in air containers
while it is moving in a surface vehicle, but the cargo
usually is transferred in loose form because of the
inability of the more popular 727's and DC-9's to carry
8x8x20-foot intermodal air containers.[Ref.9:p.58] A study
was conducted by Air Transport Association of America (ATA)
of air carriers transporting containers under container
tariffs. They found that more than 40 percent of air
carriers freight volume in 1982 was containerized, this was
up from 33 percent in 1977. However, these containers
generally were not used for intermodal purposes except
within the confines of an airport.[Ref.9:p.53]
Intermodal air-surface container services started
off encouragingly when hundreds of 8x8x20-foot intermodal
air containers were acquired by major airlines dur g the
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1970's. Experiments involving 8x8x20-foot container
movements of air shipments combined with truck, sea, and
rail piggyback were successful. One example is the well-
publicized contract that involved General Motors, Alitalia
and Lufthansa. Both airlines started an airbridge
connection Zrom Europe to Detroit, making three flights a
week with Pininfarnia-designed car bodies for Cadillac.
Boeing 747s carried car bodies in 8x8x20-foot containers on
each flight to Detroit, and brought back 90 tons of
automobile components on the return journey in the air
containers.[Ref.17:p.45] However, use of these containers
for intermodal purposes declined steadily due to costs,
preferences, and inability to maximize cubic volume. It is
evident that design and technical changes are needed to
salvage future intermodal air container use.
Although the intermodal air containers are not
significantly used today, the demand for quick door-to-door
pickup and delivery with guaranteed delivery schedule and
freight security demonstrates the potential of such
containers. In the future an effective air-container will
need to be designed to meet these demands.'Ref.9:p.176]
3. Intermodal Land Leg
The land intermodal system is composed of railroads
that can transport either containers or truck trailers.
Highway carriers can also truck containers directly from
origin to ports for ocean travel. Generally however, the
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railroad moves cargo over the long leg of the journey,
within the U.S., and the highway carrier transports the
container or trailer from the point of origin to the rail
terminal and, at the end of the rail journey, from the
terminal to the final destination. Components of the land
system include the container or wheeled trailer, container
chassis, the highway carrier, the rail cdrrier, a container
and/or trailer rail terminal, and specialized container-
handling equipment.
Between 1978 and 1987, intermodal rail carloadings
expanded from 8 percent to over 16 percent of total railroad
carloadings. This trend resulted in the resurgence of
railroad transportation in the last few years. Improved
equipment with greater capacity, such as double-stack
container cars, and redesign of these cars so they have
lighter empty weights, has contributed to this
trend.[Ref.18:pp.106-107]
The railroads have been losing customers to the
truck industry for a long time. In the past, TOFC was able
to slow that trend. Today, containers on flatcars (COFC) is
demonstrating its greater intermodal versatility relative to
TOFC. Table 2.1 shows that container loadings were up 8
percent, from 2,269,561 in 1990, to 2,450,026 in 1991.
However, the data shows that the increase in containers did
not offset the continuing decline in trailer loadings which
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in total movement was probably due to a decline in overall
freight movement due to the general economic down-turn.
[Ref.19:p.16]
The invention of the double-stack system should
allow the railroads to regain their market share from truck
longhauls. In order to accommodate double-stack containers,
rail cars are designed with a depressed well so that
containers can be stacked two-high within most railroad
clearance limits. These wells or platforms are articulated
(united or joined) in sets of five, adjacent wells being
supported by one shared rail truck assembly.[Ref.3:p.6] The
articulation of double-stack cars greatly improves ride
quality and reduces freight damage compared to conventional
flatcars. The length and weight capacity of double-stack
cars has been increased to handle 48-foot containers and
heavier loads. The most recent version is the "Type 3" car,
capable of handling 48-foot containers in all wells with 53-
foot containers on top, and equipped with 125-ton trucks to
handle up to 125,000 pounds in each well.[Ref.3:p.6] In
1989 there were approximately 3,200 five-unit double-stack
cars in service, or 16,000 total wells.[Ref.3:p.6]
Double-stack cars are lighter, shorter, more
aerodynamic, and give a better ride, than other rail
container cars. Double-stack cars provide a very good net-
to-tare (cargo weight to car plus empty container weight)
ratio and carry the greatest number of revenue loads for a
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given train length. The result is that fuel consumption is
lower due to the lower weight and labor costs are lower due
to more revenue units being moved per train crew.[Ref.3:p.6]
These two factors are the two major line-haul cost
advantages of double-stack cars over other intermodal
technologies.
E. MILITARY AND THE CONTAINER TREND
The Department of Defense has defined objectives to
establish a container-oriented distribution system capable
of meeting potential mobilization and deployment
goals.[Ref.20:p.l] One objective is aimed at establishing
containerized shipments as the preferred method of movement
of military vehicles, equipment and supplies, unless cost-
effectiveness or peculiar shipping requirements are an
overriding factor. The DOD's objectives are not limited to
the development, procurement, leasing or otherwise
controlling a family of containers. The policy also does
not recommend the procurement of a complete system for the
mobilization and deployment requirements, but rather
recommends a cooperative effort of the Military Services and
the transportation industry.[Ref.20:p.l]
The purpose of DOD's containerization policy is to
enable the mobilization and deployment objectives to be
attained by the employment of transportation industry assets
supplemented with DOD assets. DOD preference is for the use
of the transportation industry's common intermodal equipment
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such as freight containers and line-haul equipment. DOD
furnished equipment should be intermodal equipment that
fulfills unique requirements and common equipment that would
be retained by the services for an extended period of time.
To meet these goals, the military services are required
to develop plans and equipment requirements to meet their
specific needs subject to review and approval by DOD. In
order to accomplish the establishment and implementation of
DOD's objectives, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force have been given specific missions. These missions, by
Departments, are:
* Secretary of the Army. "Through the Military
Traffic Management Command (MTMC), shall manage and
monitor the status of intermodal surface containers
in common-user service while these containers are in
the Defense Transportation System."(Ref.20:p.1]
* Secretary of the Navy. "Through the Military
Sealift Command (MSC), shall act as DOD agent for
common-user service supporting those DOD Component
requirements and capability assessments coordinated
through MTMC."[Ref.20:p.l]
* Secretary of the Air Force. "Through the Military
Airlift Command (MAC), shall act as the DOD agent
responsible for the procurement of intermodal air
containers and for the implementation of a system of
airlift intermodal air containers and shelters for
the Military Services."[Ref.20:p.1]
These missions provide an overall approach to the
development and control of a DOD container system.
In general, the military services are to review,
develop, coordinate, and carry out assigned programs,
pertaining to container-oriented distribution systems. A
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major requirement of the services is that a coordinated plan
be developed and integrated into a container system within
the services, DOD components and commercial industries.
This plan would incorporate the elements that would be
common for each Service as well as the unique elements for
each Service.
Containerized movements generated in the sustainment
phase of Operation Desert Shield, in 1990-1991, were moved
by truck and rail (such as from Memphis to Charleston), and
ocean intermodal service. These were primarily B ration
meal shipments, which were assembled from inbound
subsistence, approximately 38 containers per day. The meals
were palletized and then loaded into containers (sixty 200-
250 pound pallets per 40-foot container or 15,000 pounds,
utilizing full cube).
The pallets used for the meal shipments were built at
the depot and most were brought back in the containers to be
reused. This has been found to be more cost-effective than
continually having to produce new pallets.
The supply of intermodal containers was strained by the
war. An estimated 1000 containers a week were moving to the
Gulf area. However, few were coming back in part because,
as they were emptied in the gulf area, they provided
temporary storage facilities for arriving supplies not yet
required by the forces.[Ref.21:p.12]
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F. INTERMODAL FUTURE
The trends show that future intermodal technologies will
develop by merging production and transport needs while
still being responsive to customer needs. The final closing
of these differences may ultimately see carriers becoming
part of shippers' marketing functions and/or part of the
consignees' inventory activities through contract carriage
arrangements. In this situation international
competitiveness may arise, not so much from the comparative
transport advantage of any one country, but from the ability
to integrate transport services more smoothly into
production and consumption functions. To compete, carriers,
agents, financial institutions, equipment suppliers and
shippers will need to improve their commercial dialogues
with each other, and develop new, often more cooperative
strategies.[Ref.31:p.331
In the past, the United States transportation industry
has deteriorated due to our weakening transportation
infrastructure and to our poor or deferred maintenance
practices. We have also fallen behind our foreign
competitors in capital investment, GNP growth, and our
ability to compete abroad.
To maintain an efficient and effective transportation
network, both internationally as well as domestically, the
United States needs to rebuild its decaying infrastructure.
The Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, passed by
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Congress on 27 November 1991, will help in providing the
congressional attention needed to foster
intermodalism.[Ref.23:p.13] The Transportation Bill is
based on four basic principles:
1. Intermodality: The optimum and most efficient
use of our transportation resources and
interconnections of all modes of transportation-
highways, transit, airports, harbors and others-to
improve productivity and to reduce air pollution and
energy consumption.[Ref.24:p.69)
2. Flexibility: State and local decision makers
should have the option of how to invest
transportation resources in their areas. It should
not be up to the federal government to tell the
state and local officials how to invest their
transportation infrastructure funds.[Ref.24:p.69]
3. Equity: Some states had legitimate complaints
about their fair return from the Highway and Transit
Trust Funds. To the maximum extent possible, this
bill addresses these concerns.[Ref.24:p.69]
4. Financial Investment Resources: The bill
provides for substantial investment in the
transportation infrastructure that will pay
immediate and long-term economic dividends which are
absolutely essential to meet the enormous needs of
our nation for road and bridge construction and
rehabilitation, expanded mass-transit capacity and
implementation of new technologies.[Ref.24:p.69]
This bill is expected to promote the development of a
national intermodal transportation system to obtain the
optimum yield of our transportation resources. It will be
the focal point of domestic policy in the future and gives
the hope of further intermodal growth.
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III. THE DOUBLE-STACK CONCEPT
A. INTRODUCTION
Double-stack container operations has brought the
intermodal industry to the point of large-scale domestic
containerization. Domestic container services are routinely
marketed by railroads, ocean carriers, and third parties.
Thereby, giving intermodal transportation sustainability.
Several factors have helped to promote the double-stack
revolution. First, there was the regulatory exemption of
intermodal rail transportation, and the increased use of
railroad contracts.[Ref.10:p.18] Then the Shipping Act of
1984 allowed maritime liner carriers to enter into joint
services and price arrangements with railroads and motor
carriers. Now liner carriers are permitted to establish
through rates involving both ocean and inland movements.
[Ref.18:p.242] The act also facilitated through intermodal
bills of lading. Prior to that, ship companies were limited
to port-to-port rate making. Finally, there was the rapid
growth of containerized imports where the availability of
double-stack technology was found to be the most efficient
means of carrying large numbers of containers
inland.[Ref.10:p.19]
These factors led to a rapid increase in the volume of
international containers moving inland on double-stack
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trains under contracts between railroads and ocean carriers,
such as between American President Lines (an ocean carrier)
and Union Pacific Railroad. The liner carriers took the
initiative at the beginning of this trend (early 80's),
guaranteeing annual traffic volumes and providing cars to
minimize the risk to the railroads fRef.9:p.31]. As the
potential of double-stack traffic became more apparent,
railroads hastened to offer contracts, supply equipment, and
operate common-user trains to attract more ocean carriers.
[Ref.9:p.831 By 1989, the railroad/ocean carrier
relationship had become a series of individual relationships
ranging from simple rate structures covering volume "tiers"
to large-scale assumption of railroad intermodal marketing
functions by ocean carrier affiliates.[Ref.25:pp.14-15]
Ports are involved in double-stack traffic largely as
providers of facilities, but they have had, and will likely
continue to have, other roles as well. In the initial
period (mid 80's) of double-stack activity, ports took an
active role in promoting double-stack service for their
ocean-carrier clients.[Ref.26:p.35] This activity did not
extend to operating trains, although some serious proposals
were made. Currently, the most active port role is as the
provider of on-dock facilities, where containers can be
transferred between double-stack trains and the marine
terminal without motor carrier drayage over city streets
between the rail lines and the ports.
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To get a better understanding of the roles and benefits
of the double-stack system, this chapter will provide some
insights on the double-stack concept and discuss its
advantages and disadvantages. We will investigate the use
of double-stack domestically and touch on its military
logistical use.
B. BACKGROUND OF THE DOUBLE-STACK SYSTEM
1. Early Development of Double-Stack
Double-stack container services were not created by
the actions of any one party. They emerged instead from a
series of actions, each facilitating or broadening double-
stack services in some way.
The first critical development was the design of the
double-stack car itself by a team of Southern Pacific
mechanical engineers under the direction of W. E. Thomford
in conjunction with American Car and Foundry (ACF)
Industries in 1977.[Ref.3:p.5] These cars were specifically
intended to reduce linehaul costs of Southern Pacific's (SP)
Sea-Land traffic in the Southern Corridor. A single-
platform version was completed in 1977 and subsequent
versions were produced in 1979 and 1981. These later
platforms grew to three and five articulated (mechanically
joined) units, with five units becoming a standard for all
subsequent production.[Ref.3:p.17]
American President Lines (APL) ran its first
experimental double-stack train, with Southern Pacific, from
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Los Angeles to Chicago in 1983. Double-stacking was a
technological improvement over the intermodal flatcars which
had been in used on APL Liner-trains since 1979. APL sought
to maintain and improve on the control it had achieved over
inland operations with its conventional Liner-train service,
and to reduce linehaul costs on that service.
Regular APL double-stack service started in 1984,
and was followed by double-stack service by Sea-Land in
1985. Soon thereafter, eight rail carriers were providing
services from both coasts. During 1985, there were 32
eastbound Lrains a week from the west coast. As of June
1988, 76 trains operated each week between 20 city-pairs.
The 1990 container portion of the U.S. intermodal market was
45%, providing a large potential market for double-stack
services. [Ref.27:p.24]
Despite being occasionally identified as the
operators of double-stack trains, ocean carriers actually
only own railcars and there are only three ocean carriers
who actually acquired double-stack cars (APL, Sea-Land, and
Maersk). Railroads acquired a few cars (either leased or
purchased), but the vast majority of double-stack cars has
been provided by Trailer Train (now known as TTX). Trailer
Train Company was incorporated by the Pennsylvania Railroad
and the Norfolk and Western Railway in 1955. Now owned by
14 railroads and rail systems, Trailer Train provides a
fleet of over 44,000 intermodal cars.[Ref.28]
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Trailer Train's decision to create a double-stack
car fleet was a major factor in the double-stack momentum.
Once Trailer Train began leasing double-stack cars, it was
no longer necessary for either ocean carriers or railroads
to commit capital to the new service. Until this ability
was recently curtailed as a condition of continuing anti-
trust immunity, Trailer Train could assign a group of
double-stack cars to a specific railroad for a period of
several years for use by a specific ocean carrier. By
permitting ocean carriers and railroads to start services
without the capital outlay for rail cars, Trailer Train
dramatically reduced the barriers to double-stack service
and diminished the risks borne by individual carriers. This
allowed expansion of double-stack services beyond the
dedicated trains of major ocean carriers. In fact, with few
exceptions, the ocean carriers who purchased or leased cars
for their initial trains turned to the use of Trailer Train
cars for subsequent expansion. Trailer Train thereafter
committed heavily to double-stack technology. Further
development of domestic double-stack services is likely to
rely on Trailer Train and/or other firms to supply and
maintain pools of double-stack cars.
2. Developments After Regulatory Reform
As these developments were occurring, railroad
regulation was being substantially reduced (between 1976 and
1981), permitting railroads to conduct intermodal business
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in a much freer environment. In 1976, Congress passed the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform (4R) Act,
which allowed the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 2 to
exempt certain traffic under limited circumstances.
(Ref.18:p.l11] The 4R Act paved the way for more extensive
regulatory reform. The major progress in railroad
deregulation came with the passage of the Staggers Rail Act
of 1980, which gave the iailroads considerable latitude in
determining and modifying rates without the ICC's
interference, and backed up an earlier ICC ruling on
contracts by permitting contract carriage by rail common
carriers. The ICC then exempted some TOFC/COFC service from
rate regulation in 1981 and eliminated all remaining
TOFC/COFC rate regulation in 1987. The railroads' ability
to make contracts wit' their customers proved to be an
important element in the success of the innovative
intermodal services developed during the
1980's.[Ref.29:p.103]
The rails' role in the double-stack industry must be
viewed in the context of overall intermodal growth and a
change in the way intermodal traffic has been conducted and
perceived. All of the early double-stack trains were
2The role of the ICC in the economic operations of carriers
has been greatly reduced since passage of the Motor and Rail
Deregulation Act in 1980. As a consequence of market place control
and reduced funding for ICC operations, the ICC now primarily
considers transportation issues of national concern.[Ref.18:p.53)
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dedicated services. Each ocean carrier had a set of double-
stack cars, owned, leased, or assigned by Trailer Train for
its use. Each service effectively operated as a unit train,
although the sets of cars were broken up and rearranged from
time to time. Thus, for the first year or so, double-stack
trains were viewed as unit trains, and operationally
distinct from other railroad trains. The introduction of
common-user services by several railroads in 1985 and 1986,
and the development of multi-destination trains, quickly
ended any such distinction.[Ref.29:pp.107-109] Railroads
now mix double-stack cars with other cars to achieve the
desired capacity and service frequency.
The introduction of double-stack service coincided
with strong growth of import cargoes in the trans-pacific
trade, which created a heavy eastbound imbalance. Based on
Bureau of the Census data, an estimated 1.4 million Twenty-
Equivalent-Units (TEU: 8x8x20-foot intermodal container) of
imports passed through the West Coast ports in 1984 compared
with only 0.9 million TEU of exports, an imbalance of 1.6:1.
The imbalance grew to 1.9:1 in 1985 and 2:1 in 1986.
Since APL initially leased or owned its double-stack cars
and had full responsibility to fill the cars in both
directions, it had significant incentive to develop
additional cargoes to fill westbound containers. In 1985,
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APL acquired a shippers' agent, National Piggyback
Services3 and a distribution service, Intermodal Brokerage
Services. It then formed American President Intermodal to
oversee its double-stack services and had APDS solicit
domestic freight and APL solicit international
cargo.[Ref.30:p.40]
While Sea-Land and Maersk also purchased double-
stack cars, few ocean carriers made the capital commitment
of APL. Most, however, recognized the need to provide
double-stack services, and some recognized the opportunity
to compete for domestic traffic. The roles played by ocean
and rail carriers thus became less clearly defined. Ocean
carriers have taken responsibility for a larger portion of
the transportation chain from shipper to consignee, and a
greater portion of the risks and revenues.
Double stacking of intermodal containers is just one
competitive advance in a deregulated industry, where
advances are occurring with increasing frequency and effect.
However, the double-stack network holds the highest
potential of being able to interconnect the total
transportation system whether it be on the ocean, on land,
or in the air.
C. ADVANTAGES OF THE DOUBLE-STACK SYSTEM
When asked in a "Traffic Management's" survey about
preference of double-stacked containers over conventional
'Renamed American President Distribution Services or APDS.
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TOFC, 58% had no preference. However, the subscribers who
did have a preference chose double-stack over TOFC 3 to 1
(3:1). (See Figure 3.1) This is due to the many advantages
of double-stack.[Ref.31:p.34] The double-stack system
reduces train lengths and reduces capital costs per payload
ton carried. Train length is important on single-track
mainlines where passing sidings limit train length and when
labor contracts are based on train length. Double-stack
equipment doubled the number of containers per train, thus
cutting train crew labor cost per container in half. The
reduction in capital costs arises from the fact that
containers, unlike trailers, have no expensive running gear
or chassis that must be carried around. Each double-stack
car can carry the same payload as five single-level flat
cars for about 75 percent of the capital costs, because the
articulated design permits elimination of four railroad
trucks and four pairs of couplers and air hoses.[Ref.28]
A standard railroad flatcar, with two 45-foot
containers, has a total tare weight of about 83,800 pounds
while the stack-train platform, with two stacked (one 45-
foot and one 48-foot) containers, weighs about 53,450
pounds, a savings in tare weight of 30,350 pounds. Net
payload to tare ratio is 1.38 for standard type COFC service
versus 1.97 for double-stack.[Ref.3:p.6] (See Table 3.1)
This reduction in weight translates into a 40 percent
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also evident in the "Net pounds Per Foot" data, in Table
3.1, where cargo density is most efficient with double-
stack.
Total cost savings for the line-haul portion of the
train movement have been estimated as high as 40 percent by
the Association of American Railroads. Other estimates,
however, indicate total cost savings of through movement
when compared to conventional TOFC is about 20 to 25
percent.[Ref.32:p.73] The lower figure reflects the higher
drayage expense caused by the fact that double-stack
terminals are fewer in number and farther apart.
An important cost savings and marketing advantage for
double-stack lies with low loss and damage claims. The
platform articulation eliminates some couplers and
associated gear. This has reduced slack action, or the
running in and out of couplers that magnifies the forces of
inertia and creates damage to cargo. Double-stack
operations are also rarely switched when loaded, thus
further reducing rate of cargo damage. Situations where
freight cars bump into one another as they are classified
and pushed over the hump (in railroad hump yards) are, as a
result, usually avoided.
Double-stack cars are also a deterrent to theft because
the container doors are difficult, if not impossible to open
while in transit. Since loss and damage is a strong concern
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of shippers, double-stacks' loss and damage experience is a
significant marketing advantage.
D. DISADVANTAGES OF THE DOUBLE-STACK SYSTEM
The disadvantages of double-stack are the large volumes
of freight required to make it viable and high terminal
costs. As a result, double-stack trains can only operate
economically in long-haul service between high-volume
terminals, where high terminal costs can be spread over more
miles and containers, thus reducing terminal costs relative
to total revenues.[Ref.33:p.16] The requirement for high
volume, long-haul lines limits the markets where double-
stack can operate successfully.
As time progresses, volume, management experience, and
new technology may shorten the break even distance for
double-stack. Given careful asset management and reasonably
high volumes, it has been suggested that double-stack can
eventually operate in corridors as short as 500
miles.[Ref.33:p.19]
Double-stack trains also need high overhead clearances
(a minimum of 20 feet, 6 inches, from the top of the rail,
is required to accommodate two stacked containers). This
rules out many potential routes where restrictive tunnel and
bridge clearances are encountered. However, low line-haul
costs have made it economical to increase the clearances and
thus open up many of these routes.[Ref.10:p.18]
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In addition to the need to improve bridge and tunnel
clearances, there are questions about improvements needed in
roadbeds, rolling stock, and terminal facilities. Terminal
facilities require considerable improvement in many
localities in terms of space and handling equipment.
Rail carriers have mixed feelings about double-stack
train operations. Negatives reactions, however, are not
being expressed too loudly in the face of the headlong rush
to compete in double-stack markets.
E. DOMESTIC USE OF THE DOUBLE-STACK SYSTEM
The introduction of double-stack equipment in the 1980's
for marine containers rekindled interest in the concept of
domestic containerization. This also occurred during a
period when the U.S. dollar was very strong and imports
(particularly from the Pacific Rim) far outweighed exports.
Many containers would have returned empty to West Coast
ports if it were not for domestic cargo from the East Coast
and Midwest filling the backhaul. APL, for example, was
able to generate substantial amounts of domestic backhaul
freight. Because of available backhaul capability and low
double-stack costs, domestic containerization become very
competitive and siphoned away westbound traffic from both
piggyback and highway traffic.[Ref.34:p.61]
F. MILITARY USE OF THE DOUBLE-STACK SYSTEM
The initiation of Operation Desert Shield tested our
ability to provide quick and smooth transportation for the
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massive volumes of cargo needed to be delivered. This was
an opportunity to test our intermodal capabilities.
Military volumes rose from 250-300 Forty Equivalent
Units (FEU: 8x8x40-foot intermodal container) in the early
weeks of Desert Storm, to 3,300 FEUs per week in early
February 1991. In February, APLs military volume alone, was
close to 1,000 FEUs per week.[Ref.36:p.64] "APL's domestic
transportation affiliate operated cross-country, double-
stack container trains as part of an integrated
transportation system that also included ships, truck and
computerized information systems."[Ref.36:p.64] Intermodal
companies such as APL were concerned of the possibility that
"The government could influence schedules or even commandeer
double-stack trains to rapidly shuttle cargo to
seaports."[Ref.35:p.34] However, since many'military
transportation planners were skeptical of the applicability
of containerization, many items that were containerizable
were not carried in containers.[Ref.36:p.66] In most cases
old transportation techniques superseded DOD Directive No.
4500.37 (containerization policy) for convenience sake.
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IV. GROWTH IN DOUBLE-STACK NETWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will investigate the growth of the double-
stack network and its effect on the trucking industry. We
will look at the current double-stack network and then
discuss the growth in this network. The question of whether
double-stack can actually compete against truck services
will be answered and the cost to the rail industry to
maintain or surpass its present competitive standing, with
trucking, will be considered. We will then explore the
items that may effect double-stacks' future growth.
B. THE DOUBLE-STACK NETWORK
The double-stack network is shown in Figure 4.1. The
combination of routes and hubs shown in this figure provides
very extensive national coverage, enabling double-stack
trains to serve all major U.S. markets. As Figure 4.1
illustrates, double-stack operations have begun to resemble
a network of interlocking movements rather than a collection
of unrelated unit trains. This development has greatly
assisted double-stack operators in competing with trucks,
because it has created the traffic density which permits a
service frequency needed to attract the business of







extended double-stack service to several hubs that could not
yet support dedicated hub-to-hub unit trains.
C. GROWTH IN THE NETWORK
Intermodal rail traffic grew dramatically in the 1980's
as shown by Figure 4.2 (especially from 1982-1987 during
which the average annual growth rate was approximately 12
percent). The growing share of railroad traffic and
revenues demanded a larger share of management attention.
The dedicated "unit" trains of APL and Sea-Land set the
pattern for early double-stack operations. The introduction
of "common-user" service by Burlington Northern (BN) in 1985
led to far greater flexibility in double-stack operations.
As Table 4.1 shows, in 1983, the domestic intermodal rail
fleet totalled 109,900 spaces, including 109,000 spaces on
conventional cars, 200 spaces on third generation TOFC cars,
400 on double-stack cars and 300 RoadRailer spaces. By
1989, the number of spaces on conventional cars was down to
79,000 while the double-stack fleet rose to 30,000
spaces.[Ref.33:p.17]
More than 100 trains depart the West Coast each week
with double-stack traffic. Configurations include single-
customer unit trains, regularly scheduled common-user trains
serving multiple customers, combined double-stack and
conventional intermodal trains and blocks of double-stack






















Today's container traffic is still overwhelmingly
international, and rail container flows are concentrated in
traffic lanes connecting major maritime container ports with
major inland intermodal hubs. Domestic container movements
accounted for only 9 percent of rail intermodal traffic in
1989, but this market is seen as having excellent growth
potential.[Ref.26:p.36]
D. DOUBLE-STACK VERSUS TRUCKS
Double-stack container systems have line-haul cost
advantages over other modes of transportation and may
displace those modes.[Ref.16:pp.252-253] However, unless
double-stack service is fully competitive with truckload
service in a given market, domestic double-stack traffic
will remain subject to erosion by motor carrier competition
in that market.
It has been determined that door-to door domestic
double-stack linehauls must be at least 725 miles to be
competitive with the operating costs of truckload
carriers.[Ref.33:p19] In longer corridors, as will be shown
in chapter VI, double-stack has a line-haul cost advantage.
Service frequency and sufficient traffic volumes are also
critical to domestic double stack viabilty. Major domestic
corridors require six-day-per-week service (between the end
points), while five-day-a-week service is adequate for
origination and terminations at intermediate points with
lower traffic volumes.[Ref.33:p.17] A five-day-per-week
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schedule would allow double-stack service to compete
effectively for much, but not all, common-carrier truckload
freight.
There are several obstacles double-stack service must
overcome to reach its full potential. While some are
technical, the most serious ones involve marketing,
management and organization. In particular, the industry
must provide and market a reliable, high-quality, door-to-
door service. To capture a larger traffic share, railroads
must provide door-to-door service that is competitive on
both price and quality with truck service. The challenge
encompasses technology, line-haul operations, terminal
operations, marketing, sales, customer service, management
and organization. If the intermodal industry can overcome
the obstacles to door-to-door service quality in each of
those areas, double-stack container systems can compete
successfully with trucks and other intermodal systems and
sustain a larger market share than intermodal transportation
has yet earned.[Ref.33:p.18]
One way of organizing and managing door-to-door, double-
stack service is to bring some or all of the functions under
the ownership or control of one multimodal firm. There are
many approaches to multimodal ownership or control, and
ownership of assets or operations in more than one mode does
not always yield integrated intermodal transportation. The
goal of multimodal firms engaged in intermodal
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transportation is improved service coordination and better
asset utilization. [Ref.33:p.18]
A possible snag in the development of domestic double-
stack services is a proposal to allow larger trucks on U.S.
highways, thereby reducing truckload costs. Each 1 cent per
mile drop in truck costs would increase the minimum length
of truck-competitive double-stack hauls 11 miles beyond the
725 miles competitive mark previously mentioned. If truck
size and weight limits are relaxed to allow widespread use
of twin 48-foot trailers, truckload costs would drop about
30 percent.[Ref.33:p.17]
On the other hand, rising fuel prices or higher fuel
taxes could increase truckload costs and divert existing
truckload traffic to rail. A 25-cent fuel tax increase and
a 4-cent price increase would raise truck operating costs by
5.18 cents per mile and reduce the minimum truck-competitive
double-stack haul to 670 miles.[Ref.33:pp.16-17]
E. FUTURE GROWTH
A large gap still exists between what is possible in
double-stack operations and what is reliably achieved,
despite improved transit times and damage prevention. The
biggest shortcoming in current double-stack and other
intermodal operations is the lack of sensitivity to market
needs, particularly in door-to-door reliability.
[Ref.4:pp.17-181
Double-stack transportation has developed despite
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fragmentation, yet it cannot attain its ultimate potential
unless the necessary functions are successfully integrated




The growth of domestic containerization raises many
interrelationship issues. The question of compatibility
between international and domestic container-based
intermodal transportation will determine the true value of
containerization as a convenient intermodal medium to
transfer cargo safely, quickly and economically. This
chapter is concerned with the relationships between
international and domestic containerization. It focuses on
physical, operational, and port relationships which affect
the long term capabilities of the double-stack system.
B. PHYSICAL RELATIONSHIPS
1. Relationships in Containre Sizes
There has been a good deal of concern over the
intermingling of domestic and international containers of
different sizes. International containers are all marine
containers and currently come in 20-foot, 40-foot, and 45-
foot lengths. These containers are the same width: eight
feet, their heights range from 8 feet to 9 feet 6 inches.
Containers built especially for domestic service come in 45-
foot, 48-foot, and 53-foot lengths, with the 48-foot length
being predominant.[Ref.42:p.23] Burlington Northern (BN)
has introduced a small number of 24-foot domestic flatrack
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containers2, primarily for forest products. Newer domestic
containers are 9 feet 6 inches high, and 102 inches (8 feet
6 inches) wide.
Among the international sizes, the 40-foot container
predominates on international routes involving the U.S. (On
non-U.S. routes the 20-foot container predominates.)
[Ref.9:p.122] For example, forty-foot containers account
for 71 percent of the containers passing through Southern
California. The mix varies only slightly by direction. In
Southern California, 40-foot containers accounted for 69
percent of the imports and 73 percent of the
exports.[Ref.28]
The mix of international containers is changing,
although slowly, toward the larger 45-foot containers
[Ref.28]. Since there are roughly 5.5 million Twenty
Equivalent Units (TEU: equivalent units to a 8x8x20-foot
container) in service worldwide, new purchases make only a
marginal difference in the fleet.
The major purchasers of new 45-foot containers, APL,
Maersk, and Sea-Land, are also heavy users of double-stack,
causing these new containers to show up in double-stack
operations more often than their overall prevalence would
suggest. Industry estimates indicate that over 40,000 such
2Flatrack containers are containers without ceilings and
sides. Corner posts or sidings are used to keep cargo bundled.
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containers will be in service by the end of 1992,[Ref.28]
including additions to the leasing company fleets.
The marine fleet is also getting taller, as the
number of "high cube" containers (9 feet or 9 feet 6 inches)
grows. By the end of 1992, high cube containers are
expected to account for roughly 9 percent of the world
fleet.[Ref.28] The new 45-foot containers are normally
high-cube containers and are being deployed most rapidly by
the steamship companies heavily involved in double-stack
services, and hence are probably more prevalent in U.S.
intermodal routes.
Ocean carriers do not presently use 48-foot or
larger containers in regular international service, nor do
they use containers with outside widths greater than 8 feet.
The ability of ocean carriers to use larger containers is
limited by the configuration of cellular containerships
which are ships that carry only containerized cargo.
The fleet of domestic containers has grown rapidly,
but it is still very small compared to the volume of marine
containers moving inland. The vast majority of domestic
containers are 48 feet long, 8 feet 6 inches wide (120
inches), and 9 feet 6 inches high. The so-called "48 x 102"
size also accounts for virtually all domestic containers on
order (except for the small number of 24-foot flatrack
containers ordered by BN).[Ref.37:p.49]
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Since domestic containers are not meant for
international shipments, there is no requirement to build
them to international standards. They do, however, have
standard corner castings located at 40-foot positions to
permit stacking on marine containers of the same width.
When containers are stacked, Inter-Box-Connectors (IBC) 3
are used to connect the containers at those corner castings.
A 45-foot, 48-foot, or 53-foot container (above a 48-foot
well) can be stacked on a 40-foot or larger container and
linked by IBC's positioned on the 40-foot spacing.
The International Standards Organization (ISO) is
considering a new standard for not only longer, but wider
marine containers, the so-called "wide body" containers.
The proposed 49-foot ISO container has a width of 8 feet 6
inches and a height of 9 feet 6 inches.[Ref.9:p.173] If a
new "wide-body" container standard were able to provide
castings to match 40-foot containers (as has been done with
other large cunt:ainiers), a 49-foot, 102-inch marine
container could be handled on the top tier of double-stack
cars. Subsequent orders of double-stack equipment would
likely provide for any ISO standard that stack-train
customers plan to use. There, is, however, strong opposition
to the adoption of the "wide body" standard in the U.S. from
3not to be confused with Intermediate Bulk Containers, these
containers are filled at the top, and emptied from the bottom with
the aid of gravity.
54
commercial interests. Whether it will be adopted as an ISO
standard is problematic at present.
2. Relationship Between Containers and Railcars
In order to integrate domestic and marine containers
into a common intermodal network, two physical attributes of
domestic containers must be accommodated during movement:
size (length and width), and strength (stacking height).
The size interrelationship has been addressed in the double-
stack arena by increasing the well length on new cars to
accommodate larger containers on the bottom tier, and by
installing compatible castings with 40-foot spacing on
containers that exceed the traditional 40-foot length.
In response to the proliferation in container
lengths, builders are providing new double-stack cars that
can handle container lengths up to 48 feet in the wells
[Ref.38:p.54]. Figure 5.1 shows the three types of double-
stack cars consisting of five articulated (mechanically
connected) platforms. The Type 2 and Type 3 platforms can
accommodate up to 48-foot containers in the wells and 40-
foot to 53-foot containers on the top tier connected with
IBC's. The Type 2 cars are slightly shorter due to the two
end platforms being designed to carry only up to 40-foot
containers on its well. Although many existing cars have
some loading restrictions, the loading problem will be
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mixed fleet of double-stacks will be no worse than loading
the existing and more varied mix of TOFC/COFC cars.
The current or anticipated mix of international and
domestic container sizes will not create significant
physical compatibility problems for double-stacks as long as
new, larger containers have attachment points in compatible
locations. Non-bulkhead type double-stack cars (using IBCs)
can accept virtually any combination of containers, making
terminal stacking differences minimal and avoidable. The
mix of container sizes and types coming through the rail
terminal gate will continue to command management and
clerical attention, regardless of whether the containers are
domestic or international, but it would more accurately be
regarded as an inconvenience to be dealt with rather than a
stumbling block to development of a double-stack network.
C. OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
1. Relationships with Cargo Flow
The demand for rail carriage of international
containers adds significant new cargo volumes, and thus
trains, to the U.S. rail corridors; particularly the major
mainline routes that connect West Coast ports with Midwest
and Eastern intermodal hubs. Mini-land-bridge4 traffic
between Los Angeles and New York is new cargo for the
4A joint water, rail or truck container move on a single Bill
of Lading for a through route from a foreign port to a U.S. port
destination through an intermediate U.S. port where the leg between
the two U.S. ports is a land movement (or the reverse).
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railroads, having been moved previously by the all water
route through the Panama Canal (prior to 1972). Micro-land-
bridge5 traffic between Los Angeles and Chicago is
partially new; a relatively short New York to Chicago
movement from the east coast is now supplanted by a longer
Los Angeles to Chicago move from the west coast (generally
involving different railroad carriers).
The top part of Table 5.1 shows projected year 2000
import and total international container flows, in thousands
of Forty Equivalent Units (FEU: equivalent units to 40-foot
containers; 2 TEUs=l FEU), between eight port regions and
eight destination regions (Southern and Northern California
being combined into the one California destination region).
The lower part of Table 5.1 shows projected year
2000 export in FEU's. The two right-hand columns are
percentages which sum up to 100% and present the likely
intermodal share (i.e., those containers destined outside
the local port areas) and the local share (i.e., those
cargoes consumed within the local region, or distributed by
the consignees outside the local region independently of the
ocean carriers). Table 5.1 incorporates projected annual
growth rates of 4 percent for imports and 6 percent for
exports, derived from data from Bureau of the Census and
5Same as Mini-land-bridge, except, that it is to or from an











Bilateral World Trade Forecast. (See Appendix A for raw
data.)
Import traffic on the four top intermodal corridors
show significant projected volumes in the next decade:
Southern California, to 1,125,000 FEU; "?acific Northwest, to
415,000 FEU; Mid-Atlantic, to 309,000; and Northeast, to
1,035,000. The rail corridors with the greatest total
annual demand are expected to be eastbound from Southern
California and the Pacific Northwest, westbound and
southbound from the Northeast, and northbound and westbound
from the Mid-Atlantic ports.
2. Relationships with Competition
Perhaps the most important change is the growing
inland presence of ocean carrier subsidiaries and multimodal
companies. Formation of intermodal transportation companies
has blurred traditional demarcations. Today, a railroad's
major customer on one intermodal rail corridor may be one of
that railroad's bigger competitors on another intermodal
rail corridor. For example, an ocean liner could be a
railroad's major customer on one intermodal rail corridor
but could be competing directly with the railroad on another
corridor by providing backhaul freight service, and thereby
competing for customers. [Ref.43:p.26J
The proliferation of intermodal transportation
companies has exacerbated this "competitor or customer"
problem for the railroads. At least five steamship lines
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have U.S. subsidiaries that can compete with the railroads.
The issue of commercial compatibility is less an issue of
the type of cargo (domestic versus international) than of
the complex interaction of railroads, intermodal
transportation companies, and third-party vendors. This is
not a new problem: it began with the first shippers' agent
who tendered a TOFC trailer that the railroad could have
solicited directly. The competition for the same market has
since gone in opposite directions; some railroads have given
up direct solicitation to work exclusively with third party
vendors, while other railroads have started direct sales
efforts.[Ref.33:p.19]
3. Relationships with Backhaul
Once APL and Union Pacific started regular double-
stack operations in 1984, other ocean carriers and other
railroads teamed up for double-stack traffic with varying
degrees of enthusiasm. One critical issue for both ocean
carriers and railroads was backhaul solicitation.
[Ref.39:p.55] As mentioned in chapter III, double-stack
services started during a period of strong import
imbalances, leaving a large volume of containers to be
returned empty unless westbound backhaul freight could be
found. If westbound backhaul freight could be found then
the ocean carriers would be competing directly with the
railroad industry by taking away some of their customers.
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If the railroads were to attempt large scale retail
marketing of domestic container service, there could have
been a serious conflict with the backhaul marketing of their
ocean carrier clients to domestic third parties. Railroads
would then need to choose between backhauls of the ocean
carrier (steady customers) and high revenue third party
freight. There are, however, mitigating factors. Railroad
plans for retail marketing of domestic container services
directly to the general public, shippers and receivers, is
extremely limited. Many railroads have only marketed
intermodal services directly to the largest industrial
customers. Marketing domestic container services to these
customers will not disrupt existing relationships with ocean
carriers.
Retail marketing of domestic container services will
remain in the hands of third parties for the immediate
future.[Ref.31:p.34] Ocean carrier and multimodal
subsidiaries will figure prominently in that third-party
activity.
D. PORT RELATIONSHIPS
1. Dock and Rail Relationships
Until very recently, virtually all double-stack
services originated or terminated at port cities, and were
operated primarily to serve international traffic. The
growing volume of domestic traffic carried by those services
and the prospect of extensive domestic services have led to
62
some concern over the handling of international and domestic
containers in port-area facilities. The development of on-
dock rail facilities prompts even stronger concern that such
facilities could be congested by an influx of domestic
containers. Congestion on port-area highways and streets is
also a matter for concern, particularly in Southern
California.[Ref.48)
The compatibility of domestic and international
containers at ports is an issue because of the diverse
distribution requirements of the two container services.
Railyards serving domestic shippers and consignees are not
usually adjacent to the port. Domestic container traffic
between the railyard and the domestic customers doesn't
coincide with the international container flow between the
port and destination point (railyard or customers in the
local port regions) of the containers. If domestic
containers arrive at the port (i.e., at an on-dock or near-
dock facility), their volume, while waiting to be picked up,
would increase congestion at the port. This would increase
delivery time to the domestic consignees, and thereby
increase transportation costs to the domestic consignees or
shippers.
As earlier chapters of this study have established,
there are three competitive sources of traffic which could
benefit from conversion to domestic container service: rail
TOFC, other rail (traditional boxcar) traffic, and truck
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traffic. Existing rail TOFC traffic will most likely be the
largest short-term source with relatively less boxcar
traffic being converted. Truck traffic will take longer to
convert. The immediate effect on most rail facilities would
be conversion from trailers to containers, rather than an
influx of new traffic.
Few intermodal yards, away from ports, are facing
capacity constraints at present, and those that do are being
expanded. There seems little risk of a short-term
congestion problem so severe that it would impede the growth
of either international or domestic double-stack services.
On-dock facilities cannot be expanded significantly (in most
cases) to provide extra facilities for conversions without
impinging on land required for marine terminal operations.
[Ref.40:pp.22-25] Moreover, on-dock facilities are usually
built wit port funds to provide efficient, expeditious rail
service foi ocean carriers' international containers. An
influx of domestic containers might defeat the purpose of
on-dock facilities. However, many existing rail intermodal
yards that handle trailer traffic, and alEo service ports,
believe that conversion from trailers to containers would
not add traffic.[Ref.48] The long-term outlook for
facilities depends on profitability. If domestic double-
stack service is profitable, railroads can and will invest
in the necessary facilities.
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2. Port Impact
It appears that the impact of domestic container
traffic on port facilities will be minimal. The appearance
of port congestion from domestic boxes has been raised, but
this study has found no reports of actual port congestion
from domestic container traffic. Since ocean carriers,
ports, railroads, marine terminal operators, and customers
all have incentives to keep domestic containers out of the
ports wherever congestion is likely, any influx of domestic
containers in port facilities is likely to be small and
sporadic unless local conditions encourage such routing
practices.
The operational concern is how international
containers can be brought to the marine terminals from mixed
international and domestic double-stack trains. Where
containers are drayed to the port, there is no problem in
sorting containers (other than occasional mixups). Where
containers are brought by rail to on-dock terminals,
railroads and their customers will have to cooperate in
loading and routing trains to facilitate the separation of
those cars bound for the on-dock yard.
Where there is only one intermodal yard in a city,
the routing question is moot, the issue becomes the adequacy
of that facility to handle both kinds of traffic. Where
there is a choice of railroad facilities, the railroad is
most likely to segregate traffic by handling type (i.e.,
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trailers versus containers).[Ref.28] Where substantial
amounts of trailer traffic have been converted to
containers, the railroad would more likely convert the
trailer yard or add container-handling capability, rather
than allow one facility to go under-used while the other is
overburdened. Railroads have demonstrated their willingness
to expand and change facilities as intermodal traffic itself
expands and changes.[Ref.28] For example, SP plans to
expand the Intermodal Container Transfer Facility (ICTF) in
Los Angeles.[Ref.9:pp.184-185]
With railroad-owned facilities in the same area,
domestic shippers would have every reason to avoid costly
trucking into port facilities. Thus far, railroads
typically regard service to on-dock facilities as more
costly than handling traffic in their own yards, especially
when the customer is paying for the drayage.[Ref.48]
Railroads thus have no incentive to bring domestic
containers to on-dock facilities.
There are only a few on-dock rail transfer
facilities now handling significant traffic at U.S. ports:
Tacoma (two facilities), Portland, Seattle, Long Beach, and
New York/New Jersey.[Ref.41] None is yet regarded as
congested. In the course of this study it was found that
only two, those in Tacoma, regularly handle any domestic
containers. With ample current capacity, Maersk and Sea-
Land use their on-dock terminals to handle some domestic
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backhaul movements intermingled with their international
cargo.(Ref.41] It is anticipated that this practice will
end when the rise in exports balances the import flows, or
when the on-dock transfer facility nears capacity and
priority is given to international traffic.
One cause for concern is the double-stack unit
trains operated under the control of ocean carriers or
multimodal companies. If such trains carried a mix of
international and domestic containers into crowded on-dock
facilities, the domestic containers would have to be drayed
back out. Fortunately, true unit train operations are no
longer the rule. Almost all double-stack trains are broken
up in-land and reassembled as needed.[Ref.28] Furthermore,
much of the domestic traffic solicited by ocean carriers and
multimodal companies moves on a mix of trains and schedules
separate from the dedicated trains scheduled to coincide
with ship arrivals.[Ref.28]
3. Relationships on Container Control
Tn addition to the overall problem of a larger
volume of domestic intermodal traffic and the ability of
railroad facilities to handle it, there is a question of
control. Just who controls the routing and destination of
domestic intermodal traffic, and can or will that party keep
it out of crowded marine terminals and on-dock or port area
transfer facilities?
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Ultimately, the railroad customer controls selection
of the railroad and the routing and destination of the
traffic. Customers tender traffic at a specific point for
movement to a specific point, as permitted by the carriers.
Some rail customers, principally ocean carriers or
their subsidiaries, tender both international and domestic
traffic for movement via dedicated cars6 or a completely
dedicated train. If the containers are traveling on
dedicated cars or dedicated trains, the railroad will simply
load, move, and unload the cars according to the customers'
instructions. Traffic moving in common-user or other non-
dedicated trains and cars, on the other hand, will be
loaded, routed, and unloaded in accordance with the
railroad's preferences. Domestic movements would not be
handled in on-dock facilities unless specifically directed
by the customers.
Where the railroads can identify domestic movements
and have choice, they can and will keep the bulk of such
traffic out of on-dock facilities. Where an ocean carrier
or third party controls the movement, and railroads cannot
identify domestic movements, the rail customer and the
traffic will follow economic and logistic incentives. It
will be up to each port, and the operator of any on-dock
transfer facilities, to ensure that incentives for rail
f'Dedicated double-stack cars, are double-stack cars entirely
committed to specific rail customers, principally ocean carriers.
68
customers to route domestic containers into marine
facilities are not inadvertently created.
E. SUMMARY
The compatibility issues of international and domestic
double-stack container service will not be a hindrance to
the expansion of the network, or to efficient service for
both types of traffic. However, double-stack operations
account for only a part of containerized foreign trade.
Besides trying to provide efficient rail transfer
facilities, ports must continue to build and improve their
marine terminals, the equipment, operations within the
terminals, and other projects demanded by port clients. All
of the pressures for facilities lead to a shortage of both
capital and land at most major ports. Nonetheless, the
potential benefits to all parties appear great enough to
justify the effort
required to accommodate the increasing container traffic and
to resolve compatibility issues.
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VI. OVERVIEW OF THE DOUBLE-STACK SYSTEM ECONOMICS
A. INTRODUCTION
A major factor in the success of double-stack container
service is its long-haul cost efficiency with respect to
both operating cost and equipment investment. The
consequent price savings of stacked containers for movement
of long-haul freight is impressive and is the number one
factor why rail shippers choose double-stack. Figure 6.1
confirms that the price factor stands out as the reason
shippers prefer double-stack to piggyback. The figure shows
that 70 percent of the shippers surveyed determined that
double-stack is better than piggyback with respect to price.
This chapter analyzes the economies of the double-stack
container service to see how it compares to long-haul
trucking. Since operating cost reflects the potential
performance of competing technologies, emphasis is placed on
the operating cost incurred with the double-stack system.
Appropriate capital costs are also discussed.
Pure line-haul cost is examined first. This includes
those cost elements which are only incurred in the line-haul
process and are not affected by terminal activities; in this
case labor, fuel and locomotive costs. Pure terminal cost
is discussed next. For the purposes of this presentation,




including the movements between the intermodal terminal and
the shipper or receiver. The pure terminal cost elements
include terminal lift, chassis cost and drayage cost. Car
and container costs, which are affected by both line-haul
and terminal activities, are the last cost elements
examined. The total line-haul cost and total terminal cost
per container are then calculated for two corridors, a long-
haul route (Los Angeles-New Orleans, 2010 miles) 2 and a
short-haul route (Los Angeles-Oakland, 559 miles). The
chapter ends with a concluding discussion concerning the
relationship between line-haul length and truck
competitiveness.
B. PURE LINE-HAUL COSTS
This section deals with the straight or "pure" line-haul
costs. These costs elements are only involved with the
line-haul portion of the total operating costs and are
affected by the factors associated with incremental
distance. The section begins with a discussion of the more
important individual cost elements. These include the wages
and additional expenses associated with individual crewmen,
the effects of crew size on total labor cost, and fuel and
2
.Appendix B gives the shortest rail distance between two
points. However, due to clearance requirements of double-stack the
shortest route is not necessarily the route taken. In the
computation, the best double-stack corridor distance is used for
the short-haul and long-haul points.
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locomotive costs. To help focus the discussion, cost
estimates are developed for each of these elements. Total
pure line-haul cost values are then derived for both
corridors. These latter values are based on aggregate unit-
cost estimates which include additional minor cost elements.
1. Basis of Pay
Labor costs are the most complex factor in the cost
estimation, and intermodal operations sometimes have
separate labor agreements or other special provisions.
Because we will be dealing with through double-stack trains,
we will not consider switching between terminals. The three
major remaining variables are the basis of pay, the crew
size, and the length of crew districts.[Ref.45:p.24] The
following discussion and the labor costs used in this
example are based on current agreements for a major railroad
in the Pacific Northwest, considered typical of industry
practice. For simplicity the specific rates chosen are for
"new hires."
The basis of pay involves both time and mileage,
with the actual pay rate calculated on a mileage basis. The
basic day's work is 8 hours and 108 miles. "Overmileage" is
paid for miles exceeding 108. "Overtime" is paid for time
between 8 hours and 12 hours (the legal limit for on-the-
road time), providing mileage also exceeds 108.
Table 6.1 compares pay rates for brakemen,














mile for a "new hire" brakeman, once he or she has reached
100 percent pay (pay starts at 75 percent on the date of
hire). The minimum day's pay is 108 miles at $0.94 per
mile, or $101.52.[Ref.48] Overmileage is paid at about
$0.85 per mile. All overtime hours are converted to miles,
at 1.5 times the basic rate of 13.5 miles per hour (108
miles in 8 hours), or 20.25 mph.
2. Cost of Crew Size
Labor costs for different crew sizes are presented
in Table 6.2. The four-person crew, consisting of two
brakemen, a conductor, and an engineer, is still common.
The aggregate pay for a four-person crew is about $462.24
per 8-hour/108-mile day, and $3.68 per mile for overmileage.
[Ref.481 Reducing the crew to three persons, as has become
practical for many intermodal trains, usually involves some
additional compensation for the remaining crew members,
often called "productivity pay". Typical compensation is
about $7.87 per person per trip. Pay rates for a three-
person crew plus productivity pay yield about $384.33 per
day and $2.83 per mile for overmileage. Some expedited
intermodal trains and few double-stack trains operate with
two-person crews, just a conductor and an engineer. Pay
rates for such a crew, with produrtivity pay, would be about
$274.94 per day and $1.98 per mile for over mileage. The
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To the basic pay rates discussed above must be added
payroll taxes, benefits, and other non-pay labor costs. In
the railroad industry, these additional payroll costs are
typically 27 percent of the pay; this is also reflected in
Table 6.2.
3. Fuel and Locomotive Costs
The fuel and locomotive cost estimates for double-
stack trains will be computed using data from Manalytics
Incorporated and the Ph.D. dissertation work of Professor
David Brown, (one of the thesis advisors) [Ref.50].
Table 6.3 summarizes the results showing that on the Los
Angeles-New Orleans route, fuel costs are calculated to be
approximately $47 per container for the total distance of
2010 miles. The Los Angeles-Oakland route has a fuel cost
of $13 per container for the total distance of 559 miles.
The locomotive costs are based on the GP59 four-axle
3000 horsepower locomotive. "The unit-cost is a simple
calculation based on a $1,000,000 initial cost, $60,000
maintenance cost per year, and 85% availability over a 15-
year life [Ref.50:p.203]." Table 6.3 summarizes the results
showing that on the Los Angeles-New Orleans route,
locomotive costs is calculated to be approximately $30 per
container. The locomotive cost for the Los Angeles-Oakland










0 x x x
zC
C _ M CM Em
ULC4 C4J -cm cm





4. Total Pure Rail Line-Haul Cost
The pure line-haul cost estimates for double-stack
trains are based on Manalytics Incorporated data, including
some of the previously discussed cost elements [Ref.28].
These total pure line haul cost values include the
individual elements examined above (labor, fuel and
locomotive costs), plus additional incremental maintenance
(@ $0.0012 per gross ton-mile) and other incidental
expenses. They are based on operating characteristics, such
as locomotive specifications, which are typical of double-
stack operations.[Ref. 48]
For both corridors we will assume a normal and
attainable standard of 20-car trains, 3-person crews, and
extended districts. 3 With an assumed average speed of 40
mph (including intermediate stops), the line-haul costs are
$0.124 per container-mile for Los Angeles-New Orleans, and
$0.144 for Los Angeles-Oakland.[Ref.48] The per container
line-haul cost for Los Angeles-New Orleans is then $249
($0.124x2010=249.24), while for Los Angeles-Oakland it is
$81 ($0.144x559=80.50).
C. PURE TERMINAL COSTS
The pure terminal costs include terminal lift, chassis
cost, and drayage cost. These cost elements are associated
3While until very recently, the basis of pay was 100 miles per
day, actual crew districts are usually significantly longer (up to
several hundred miles).
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with activities at the intermodal terminal, or between the
terminal and consignee/consignor (to complete the door-to-
door service).
1. Chassis Cost
Containers must be placed on chassis for the over-
the-road movement behind a truck-tractor. Chassis are also
used for container handling in intermodal rail terminals
(and at ports). The per chassis costs range from $8.00 to
$8.50 per day for most neutral chassis pools. A chassis on
long-term leases can be priced as low as $2.00 per day, but
long-term leases make the lessee responsible for
maintenance, storage, and utilization. The growing
popularity of chassis pools suggests that, on balance, the
$8.00 to $8.50 range is attractive to all but the largest
customers. For the subsequent analysis, the cost per
chassis per day is S8.00[Ref.44]. Therefore, the chassis
cost for both corridors is $16.00 ($8x2 days) per container.
To keep the cost of a container system (chassis and
container) lower, the chassis cannot be used in drayage or
storage for more than 75 percent of the total door-to-door
time.[Ref.44] This limitation could be a problem in the
shortest hauls, where terminal and drayage time together
could approach or exceed 75 percent of the total.
2. Cost of Drayage
Intermodal containers must be moveu by highway
between inland rail hubs and the actual origins or
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destinations. This function known as drayage, is usually
provided by specialized firms, often within the commercial
zone of a city. The central issue in drayage, or short-haul
trucking costs, is the time required to move the intermodal
equipment between the shipper (or consignor) and the
intermodal rail hub, plus empty back haul time, waiting
time, and other delays.
There are five major elements in the underlying cost
of highway movements. These costs are: annual cost of
truck-tractor ownership; annual cost of tractor maintenance;
annual cost of license and insurance; hourly labor cost; and
mileage-based fuel cost.[Ref.46:p.124] Four of these five
cost elements are based on time, rather than distance.
Annual ownership cost of a drayage tractor (which is
not as elaborately equipped as a long-haul tractor) is
approximately $14,000; $8,000 for the purchase (an $80,000
purchase price over 10 years, using straight-line
depreciation and allowing for no residual) and $6,000 for
interest (at a 15% cost of capital). The typical annual
cost of maintenance is approximately $16,000. Thus, the
annual cost of a fully maintained tractor is about
$30,000.(Ref.47] Normal yearly usage is about 225 days per
tractor (52 weeks, 5 days per week, less 13 holidays and 22
other days for preventative maintenance, down time and low
points in the demand cycle). Daily tractor cost is then
$30,000/225, or $133.33 per day in use. For a ten-hour day,
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this figure equates to $13.33 per hour. A local non-union
driver averages about $11.00 per hour including fringe
benefits.[Ref.47] Although some drayage is performed by
union drivers, the non-union firms tend to set the
competitive rate. Average fuel price of $1.05 per gallon4,
and an average fuel consumption rate of 5.22 miles per
gallon overall, yields a fuel cost of $.20 per mile.
The general calculation for the cost of drayage,
excluding the cost of the container and chassis, would
therefore be:
(($13.33[tractor]+$11.00[labor])xHrs)+($ 20[fuel]xMiles)
This equation yields, using 50 miles per hour, an over-the-
highway cost of $34.33 per hour, or $.69 per mile, which is
nearly the same average as a long-haul truckload carrier.
However, relatively little of a drayman's time is spent on
inter-city highways, and within urban areas the costs
change. Drayage tractors burns fuel at about I gallon per
hour while idling, and average mileage drops to about 3.5
miles per gallon in urban traffic.[Ref.47] Wiile idling in
a terminal, the drayman's cost is about $25.38 per hour, and
4$1.05 is a conservative average of lowest diesel costs from
Texico & Shell distributors in California. Prices vary nationwide
due to state diesel tax and excise tax.
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in urban traffic at 30 miles per hour it is about $33.33 per
hour.[Ref.47]
Drayage rates are set to recover the costs of mixed
urban and highway movements, for which draymen typically
charge a minimum of $35.00 per hour. The strong
relationship between time and drayage costs has been
observed empirically. In Southern California, for example,
drayage over the four miles from the Ports of Los Angeles or
Long Beach to the SP Intermodal Container Transfer Facility
(ICTF) is roughly $35, reflecting time rather than
distance.[Ref.48]
Drayage hours also include time spent waiting in
terminals and at the shipper and receiver. Drayage rates
usually allow two hours for picking up or dropping off a
load. Delay beyond two hours is typically billed at about
$32.50 per hour. Time in rail terminals can vary from 15
minutes in the newest and most efficient, to an hour or more
in older of congested facilities. Thus, even the shortest
trips are often priced at $70 to $80 per round trip to allow
for up to two hours of waiting. The low utilization
involved in loading, unloading, and waiting yields a very
high cost for each mile travelled.
Assuming a drayage distance of up to 30 miles, about
half the width of a commercial zone or a metropolitan area,
round-trip drayage would require about 4 hours. Then, with
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a drayage rate of $35.00, drayage would cost $140 on each
end of the trip for a total of $280 for both corridors.
3. Total Pure Terminal Cost
Double-stack services include substantial expenses
on both ends of the trip for terminal transfer operations,
chassis supply, and drayage. These costs are independent of
line-haul trip length, but they can vary substantially
between locations.
Industry representatives provided a wide range of
estimates for terminal lift costs, and references to other
studies widened the range further. The most representative
estimate, and the one chosen for use here is $26 per lift
for an all-inclusive contract operation (no railroad
employees) at a major hub.[Ref.48] This cost does not
include amortization of the underlying railroad assets,
which was estimated at $8.00 to $10.00 per lift for a large,
relatively new facility. Using $8.00 per lift for this
amortization, yields a minimum total terminal lift and
facility cost of $34.00 per lift.[Ref.48] Therefore,
terminal lift is $68 ($34x2 lifts) for both the long-haul
and short-haul corridors.
Pure terminal costs per container for both corridors
can be summarized as $68 for terminal lift, plus $16 chassis
costs, plus drayage costs of $280 for a total of $364.00.
84
D. CAR AND CONTAINER COSTS
Car and container costs are affected by both line-haul
and terminal operations, and are therefore discussed here,
separately from the pure line-haul and pure terminal cost
elements. In the next section, these car and container
costs are used to help calculate total line-haul and
terminal cost values.
1. Cost of Double-Stack Cars
Currently, Trailer Train is the major source of
double-stack cars. Moreover, railroad officials and
supplier contracts agreed that Trailer Train's rates serve
as a benchmark for the industry.[Ref.33:p.18] The Trailer
Train rate generally includes a per diem charge and a
mileage charge. These are full-service rates, including
both time-based and mileage-based maintenance. The most
recent Trailer Train double-stack purchases are "heavy lift"
cars, with 125-ton trucks, capable of handling 20-foot to
48-foot containers in all wells.5 The current rate per car
is $69.84 per day and $0.065 per mile, per car [Ref.44].
Assuming a full carload of ten 48-foot containers, this rate
equates to a cost of $6.98 per day and $0.0065 per mile for
each 48-foot container unit. Table 6.4 summarizes these car
5As mentioned earlier, 53-foot containers can be stacked on
top, however, for simplicity we will assume all containers used for

















costs and indicates the corresponding costs for TOFC
equipment. The mileage rates in Table 6.4 also reflect
differences in maintenance expense for each type of car.
The differences in mileage costs are more significant on the
long hauls which typify intermodal movements. Assuming a
2,000 mile haul, the difference between $0.0065 per mile and
$0.015 per mile comes to $17.00 per unit between double-
stack and piggyback. The table also shows a line-haul total
mileage equivalent, including per diem, at 40 mph for a 24-
hour day.
The per diem charges for Trailer Train cars apply to
time spent in terminals as well as time spent on the road.
If a double-stack car spends 12 hours in the terminal at
each end of the line-haul, it would accumulate 24 hours of
terminal time for each one-way trip. For double-stack cars,
this per diem implies a fixed cost of $6.98 per container
space per trip in addition to the variable line-haul costs.
For conventional piggyback cars, this fixed terminal cost is
$5.16 per trailer space.[Ref.44]
Figure 6.2 displays the relationship between total
railroad rolling stock costs (line-haul plus terminal) and
length of haul for double-stack and conventional piggyback
cars. Space per container on the double-stack car has a
higher fixed cost (on the vertical axis), but progressively







charge. Both curves drop sharply between 100 and 700 miles,
the effect of allocating the fixed terminal per diem expense
over a progressively longer line-haul. Once the length of
haul exceeds 700-900 miles, the curves are nearly flat with
double-stack cars having a lower cost per space mile.
Returning to our double-stack long-haul versus
short-haul comparison, a Los Angeles-New Orleans door-to-
door move requires two days of line-haul. Therefore, line-
haul car costs are ($6.98x2)+($.0065x2010) =$27.03 ($27
rounded) per container. Similarly, for a Los Angeles-
Oakland move, a one-day line-haul implies line-haul car
costs of ($6.98xl)+($.0065x559) =$10.61 ($11 rounded). For
both corridors, terminal car costs are $6.98 ($7 rounded)
per container.
2. Cost of Containers
Containers or trailers are generally obtained either
from short-term leasing pools such as those managed by
Trailer Train, or through long-term leases which, from an
operating point of view, are equivalent to out-right
ownership. The daily costs of containers and trailers can
differ significantly, as shown with Table 6.5.[Ref.44] Both
the pool and lease costs in Table 6.5 include maintenance;
the pool costs also include storage while long-term leases
do not. The greatest differences between pool and long-term
lease are risk and utilization. The use of pool equipment














the equipment is not used. However, long-term lease or out-
right ownership does entail risk, management, and the
responsibility for seeing that the unit achieves acceptable
utilization. Large carriers or multi-modals that can accept
risk, usually manage the equipment effectively and thereby
achieve high utilization. Such carriers can obtain
significant savings by either a long-term lease or out-right
ownership of the equipment.[Ref.45:p.23]
Using the pool cost, the per diem on a 48-foot x
8.5-foot container is $6.50 per day.[Ref.44] For the Los
Angeles-New Orleans move the container cost is $32.50. This
cost is broken down into a line-haul container cost of $13
($6.50x2 days) and a terminal container cost of $19.50
(including time for pick-up and delivery). The container
cost for the Los Angeles-Oakland move is $22.75 ($3.25 for
line-haul and $19.50 for terminal activities).
E. TOTAL COST DOOR-TO-DOOR MOVEMENT
To obtain the total cost of a door-to-door double-stack
movement, one must add pure line-haul costs, pure terminal
costs and, finally, car and container costs. Table 6.6
summarizes the total costs for door-to-door double-stack
transport using the values computed earlier. Recall that
these values are based on calculations assuming a 20-car
train, 3-person crew, with extended districts for both
routes. Line haul car costs assume two days for Lc:
















Container costs assumes five days for Los Angeles-New
Orleans (one day to load and pickup, two days line-haul, one
day at the terminal, and one day to deliver and unload) and
three days for Los Angeles-Oakland (one day to load, one day
line-haul and at the terminal, and one day to unload). All
terminal costs are the same for both corridors.
Table 6.6 reflects a dramatic difference in cost per
mile for the two corridors. This is consequence of the
length of the haul. Although the unit line-haul costs are
slightly higher for shorter hauls, the big difference is in
the allocation of fixed costs over the line-haul miles. The
estimated fixed costs of terminal lift, chassis, drayage and
terminal car/container use total $391 per container. Over
2010 miles, this fixed cost averages $.19 per mile. Over
559 miles, this fixed cost averages $.70 per mile.
In the long-haul corridor (Los Angeles-New Orleans) the
total cost per container-mile ($.34) is clearly competitive
with truckload costs (at $0.71 per mile), even if a rate
discount is offered by the trucker [Ref.44]. Indeed, there
is little disagreement that double-stack operations have a
marked cost advantage over trucks for such long
hauls.[Ref.33:p.15]
For the short-haul corridor (Los Angeles-Oakland) the
total door-to-door cost is $.87 per container-mile under the
assumptions given above. The Los Angeles-Oakland trip
yields a value that is not competitive with truckload costs
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(at $.71 per mile). This analysis indicates that the break-
even distance between double-stack and over-the-road
trucking is about 710 miles.
F. DOUBLE-STACK VERSUS TRUCK
Railroad and truck mileage from origin to destination
are seldom the same due to the highway and track layout. In
many instances the variation is far enough apart to affect
the ability of railroads to compete on short hauls. On long
hauls, the cost advantage is great enough, and the transit
time long enough, for the railroads to overcome a
significant degree of variation. However, the distance
variation between track and road, as a percentage of total
distance, tends to decline as length of haul increases. The
highway distance between Los Angeles and New Orleans is
roughly 1883 miles, 7 percent less than the rail distance of
2010 miles (see Appendix B). On shorter hauls, however, the
difference can be significant. The distance over Southern
Pacific's Central Valley route between Oakland and Los
Angeles (used for SP's priority trains and thus for our cost
analysis) is 559 miles. The highway distance is around 379
miles or 32 percent less. The railroad cannot be cost-
competitive on that route.
Appendix B compares rail and truck (highway) distances
for some 200 city pairs representing major intermodal
candidates. The rail mileage is actually shorter in a
handful of cases (e.g., Chicago-Memphis or Kansas City-
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Detroit). On average, however, rail mileage are about 8
percent longer than truck mileage.
When drayage is limited to the commercial zone, a
double-stack train with a line-haul of 725 miles can be
truck-competitive.[Ref.42:p.22] Figure 6.3 indicates the
tradeoff between line-haul and drayage distance with respect
to competitiveness. The area under the line where double-
stacks are competitive assumes highly efficient operations
and 100 percent loaded containers and cars in both
directions. Only the most successful double-stack operators
approach such cost and utilization assumptions. However,
these standards must be approached by double-stack services
seeking to be competitive with trucks on hauls as short as
700 miles.[Ref.42:p.23]
This finding coincides with the results of the 1977
Census of Transportation, which found little rail market
share in hauls of less than 500 miles; 83 percent of the
intercity merchandise was moved by motor carrier in this
short haul market.[Ref.49:p.135] Roughly 11 percent of rail
traffic was found to be in the 500-999 mile range where, in
particular, this study found double-stack service to be
truck-competitive. The remaining 6 percent of intercity
movement was in hauls of 1,000 miles or more. As this
chapter has shown double-stacks appear to have an advantage
and, as a consequence, railroads have been found to hold a










VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The research shows that there is an enormous growth
potential of double-stack container systems, particularly in
domestic freight. Containers facilitate smooth transition
between modes of travel, and double-stack trains provide
quick dependable transportation on the long-haul land leg.
Within the intermodal industry, double-stacked
containers can be efficiently used to quickly and safely
transport virtually any commodity or cargo. The double-
stack network shows promise that it may be able to resolve
the problem of fragmentation which has prevented intermodal
service from becoming truck-competitive.
Through the investigation process for this thesis, it
was determined that containerization, especially the double
stack container system, has affected the shipper's
perception of domestic intermodal transportation as an
alternative to trucks. Double-stack service is growing and
exhibits cost competitiveness with trucking in dense traffic
corridors. Opportunities exist for introducing stack trains
in less dense corridors, as in outlying areas between major
hubs.
The compatibility issues of international and domestic
double-stack containers and services was discussed. These
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issues will probably not create a hindrance to the expansion
of the network, or to efficient service for both types of
traffic. However, there are still numerous problems to be
overcome, and solutions will require time, money, and
management attention.
B. CONCLUSION
Shifting trade patterns and globalization have creating
new opportunities for intermodalism. It is time for
intermodal transportation to seize the new opportunities and
potential profits with respect to shippers looking for
dependable, high-quality, value-added service.
Full realization of the double-stack potential may
require the railroad industry to take unaccustomed steps
into marketing, sales, and customer service. The
alternative is to become strictly line-haul contract
carriers, and rely on third parties or ocean carrier
affiliates for marketing, customer service, door-to-door
management, and perhaps even terminal operations.
For ports and ocean carriers, the implications are
mixed. Ports will be under continuous competitive pressure
to accommodate international double-stack growth, but will
be only indirectly affected by domestic containerization.
Ocean carriers, too, will be subject to competitive
pressure, but may find new opportunities in meshing their
international container movements with a growing domestic
double-stack service.
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This thesis identifies several obstacles to achieving
that potential. None is insurmountable, but all will
require sustained commitment of resources and management
attention to one objective: provision of improved, reliable,
door-to-door service. Some obstacles are technical,
involving the features of double-stack cars and containers,
the efficiency and reliability of operations, and the
accommodation of new traffic patterns. The more serious
obstacles, and those requiring the most immediate attention,
tend to involve marketing, management, and organization.
In order to be competitive, the intermodal firm must
meet changing customer needs with comprehensive, precise,
reliable and timely transportation, while also providing
total logistics management services. Today, customers
desire flexible, responsive transportation with matching
networks that can take materials and products around the
world, not only port-to-port but door-to-door. The newest
player in the intermodal transportation industry is the
multimodal firm which can offer integrated double-stack
service with truck-competitive transit times and door-to-
door delivery.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Greater awareness of the benefits available from double-
stack train service and its equipment is highly recommended
for all military personnel involved in or dealing with the
transportation industry. Awareness of double-stack train
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routes opens a new avenue for negotiating for the commercial
movement of military cargo in volume point-to-point rates,
thereby, saving in long-haul transportation costs.
The military should invest in research and development
of specialized containers which will meet ISO (Organization
for International Standards) standards and, in addition,
meet specific military needs. By containerizing the bulk of
military cargo, mobilization can be streamlined and double-




INTERMODAL HUB VOLUMES FOR YEAR 2000
BASED ON COMBINED INTERMODAL, BOXABLE, AND TRAM DIVERSION FEUS
DATA SOURCES: ICC CARLOAD WAYBILL SAMPLE WITH ASSUMED 4 PERCENT
ANNUAL GROWTH AND TRAM TRUCK DIVERSIONS
FEUS FEUS TOTAL FEU
SEA NUMBER AND NAME ORIGINATED TERMINATED VOLUME
1 BANGOR, ME 733 133 866
2 PORTLAND-LEWISTON, ME 134 669 803
3 BURLINGTON, VT 4,236 3,723 7,959
4 BOSTON, MA 120,011 202,758 322,769
6 HARTFORD-NEW HAVEN-SPRINGFLD, CT-MA 49,485 54,672 104,157
7 ALBANY-SCHENECTADY-TROY, NY 24,037 20,915 44,952
8 SYRACUSE-UTICA, NY 33,259 16,388 49,647
9 ROCHESTER, NY 49,215 14,196 63,411
10 BUFFALO, NY 38,192 36,838 75,030
1l BINGHAMTON-ELMIRA, NY 601 1,666 2,267
12 NEW YORK, NY 507,453 623,809 1,131,262
14 WILLIAMSPORT, PA 167 0 167
15 ERIE, PA 7,692 7,368 15,060
16 PITTSBURGH, PA 20,678 25,824 46,502
17 HARRISBURG-YORK-LANCASTER, PA 37,637 75,109 112,746
18 PHILADELPHIA, PA 183,302 306,250 489,532
19 BALTIMORE, MD 108,076 170,425 278,501
20 WASHINGTON, DC 84,318 160,663 244,981
21 ROANOKE-LYNCHBURG, VA 1,667 1,800 3,467
22 R:C.:MOND, VA 4,330 6,061 10,391
23 NORFOLK-VIRGINIA BCH-NEWPT NEWS, VA 92,544 92,520 185,064
24 ROCKY MNT-WILSON-GREENVILLE, NC 2,331 1,865 4,196
25 W:.MINGTON, NC 9,725 8,192 17,917
25 FAYETTEVILLE, NC 533 0 533
23 GRE-NSBORO-WINSTON-SALEM-HIGHPNT, NC 23,578 22,915 46,493
29 CHARLOTTE, NC 36,604 38,298 74,902
30 ASHEVILLE, NC 4,897 3,597 8,494
31 GREENVILLE-SPARTANBURG, SC 11,391 9,196 20,587
34 CHARLESTON-NORTH CHARLESTON, SC 85,303 104,129 189,432
35 AUGUSTA, GA 4,396 866 5,262
36 ATLANTA, GA 235,913 203,259 439,172
37 COLUMBUS, GA 2,999 1,598 4,597
38 MACON, GA 33,506 8,264 41,770
39 SAVANNAH, GA 92,731 99,108 191,839
40 ALBANY, GA 3,799 1,134 4,933
41 JACKSONVILLE, FL 235,996 253,162 489,158
42 ORLANDO-MELBOURNE-DAYTONA BEACH, FL 34,834 56,947 91,781
43 MIAMI-FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 139,615 289,837 429,452
44 TAMPA-ST. PETERSBURG, FL 25,378 64,272 89,650
46 PENSACOLA-PANAMA CITY, FL 666 301 967
47 MOBILE, AL 43,993 24,399 68,392
48 MONTGOMERY, AL 11,259 4,533 15,792
S49 BIRMINGHAM, AL 72,096 67,442 139,538
50 HUNTSVILLE-FLORENCE, AL 8,327 5,529 13,856
51 CHATTANOOGA, TN 36,234 19,786 56,020
52 JOHNSON CTY-KINGSPT-BRISTOL, TN-VA 24,776 15,922 40,698
53 KNOXVILLE, TN 5,665 6,597 12,262
54 NASHVILLE, TN 48,819 39,764 88,583
55 MEMPHIS, TN 299,794 236,622 536,416
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APPENDIX A
INTERMODAL HUB VOLUMES FOR YEAR 2000
BASED ON COMBINED INTERMODAL, BOXABLE, AND TRAM DIVERSION FEUSDATA SOURCES: ICC CARLOAD WAYBILL SAMPLE WITH ASSUMED 4 PERCENT
ANNUAL GROWTH AND TRAM TRUCK DIVERSIONS
FEUS FEUS TOTAL FEUBEA NUMBER AND NAME ORIGINATED TERMINATED VOLUME
56 PADUCAH, KY 1,833 2,300 4,13357 LOUISVILLE, KY 52,585 43,391 95,97658 LEXINGTON, KY 1,603 1,934 3,53765 CLEVELAND, OH 58,865 67,179 126,04466 COLUMBUS, OH 71,226 55,289 126,51567 CINCINNATI, OH 93,172 73,994 167,16670 TOLEDO, OH 38,987 25,729 64,716
71 DETROIT, MI 171,940 163,002 334,94272 SAGINAW-BAY CITY, MI 0 167 16773 GRAND RAPIDS, MI 3,664 866 4,53074 LANSING-KALAMAZOO, MI 0 7,368 7,36875 SOUTH BEND, IN 200 167 36776 FORT WAYNE, IN 9,553 1,731 11,284
-8 ANDERSON-MUNCIE, IN 0 134 13479 INDIANAPOLIS, IN 9,760 13,219 22,97980 EVANSVILLE, IN 13,651 7,529 21,18082 LAFAYETTE, IN 7,387 13,434 20,82183 CHICAGO, IL 2,215,015 2,017,302 4,232,31784 CHAMPAIGN-URBANA, IL 466 267 73385 SPRINGFIELD-DECAUJR, IL 8,860 0 8,86086 QUINCY, IL 200 0 20087 PEORIA, IL 29,610 18,537 48,14788 ROCKFORD, IL 0 6,501 6,50189 MILWAUKEE, WI 18,287 16,988 35,27590 MADISON, WI 1,868 334 2,20291 LA CROSSE, WI 133 0 13392 EAU CLA:RE, WI 1,466 1,166 2,63293 WAUSAU, WI 1,166 1,833 2,99994 APLETON-GREEN BAY-OSHKOSH, WI 16,321 13,190 29,51195 DULUTH, MN 0 134 13496 MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, MN 146,326 181,346 327,672
99 DAVENPORT-ROCK ISLAND-MOLINE, IA-IL 20,875 1,940 22,815100 CEDAR RAPIDS, IA 14,681 1,334 16,015
-I1 WATERLOO, IA 200 0 20032 FORT DODGE, IA 799 0 799
103 SIOUX CITY, IA 1,599 167 1,766104 DES MOINES, IA 55,194 27,378 82,572105 KANSAS CITY, MO 328,572 285,131 613,703
107 ST. LOUIS, MO 333,829 263,508 597,337
108 SPRINGFIELD, MO 16,589 20,075 36,664
L10 FORT SMITH, AR 11,590 1,998 13,588ill LITTLE ROCK-N. LITTLE ROCK, AR 50,770 40,362 91,13212 JACKSON, MS 11,291 17,654 28,945113 NEW ORLEANS, LA 229,040 268,817 497,857
:14 BATON ROUGE, LA 5,664 735 6,39916 LAXE CHARLES, LA 3,910 3,798 7,70817 SHREVEPORT, LA 5,631 5,216 10,84718 MONROE, LA 0 67 6719 TEXARKANA, TX 6,961 3,864 10,825
102
APPENDIX A
INTERMODAL HUB VOLUMES FOR YEAR 2000
BASED ON COMBINED INTERMODAL, BOXABLE, AND TRAM DIVERSION FEUS
DATA SOURCES: ICC CARLOAD WAYBILL SAMPLE WITH ASSUMED 4 PERCENT
ANNUAL GROWTH AND TRAM TRUCK DIVERSIONS
FEUS FEUS TOTAL FEU
BEA NUMBER AND NAME ORIGINATED TERMINATED VOLUME
1120 TYLER-LONGVIEW, TX 16,088 6,796 22,884
121 BEAUMONT-PORT ARTHUR, TX 23,838 667 24,505
122 HOUSTON, TX 268,254 351,195 619,449
123 AUSTIN, TX 167 17,861 18,028
124 WACO-KILLEEN-TEMPLE, TX 1,299 999 2,298
125 DALLAS-FORT WORTH, TX 488,595 524,888 1,013,483
127 ABILENE, TX 67 0 67
129 SAN ANTONIO, TX 61,877 51,160 113,037
130 CORPUS CHRISTI, TX 301 1,532 1,833
131 BROWNSVILLE-MCALLEN-HARLINGEN, TX 6,062 2,906 8,968
132 ODESSA-MIDLAND, TX 9,111 67 9,178
133 ELPASO, TX 38,158 29,559 67,717
134 LUBBOCK, TX 3,975 5,316 9,291
135 AMARILLO, TX 36,407 25,608 62,015
137 OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 12,263 31,085 43,348
138 TULSA, OK 24,587 27,597 52,184
139 WICHITA, KS 34,685 17,156 51,841
141 TOPEKA, KS 9,284 9,566 18,850
142 LINCOLN, NE 18,022 8,836 26,858
143 OMAHA, NE 101,688 108,657 210,345
144 GRAND ISLAND, NE 200 12,348 12,548
145 SCOTTSBLUFF, NE 400 666 1,066
146 RAPID CITY, SD 1,332 0 1,332
147 S:OUX FALLS, SD 0 67 67
149 FARGO-MOORHEAD, ND-MN 7,261 6,063 13,324
150 GRAND FORKS, ND 4,262 333 4,595
153 GREAT FALLS, MT 867 1,267 2,134
154 MISSOULA, MT 13,828 666 14,494
155 BILLINGS, MT 8,261 7,060 15,321
156 CHEYENNE-CASPER, WY 16,145 3,330 19,475
157 DENVER, CO 92,215 142,976 235,191
158 COLORADO SPRINGS-PUEBLO, CO 134 1,166 1,300
159 GRAND JUNCTION, CO 300 2,165 2,465
160 ALBUQUERQUE, NM 13,043 62,511 75,554
161 TUCSON, AZ 2,031 15,699 17,730
162 PHOENIX AZ 102,225 290,181 392,406
163 LAS VEGAS, NV 1,865 4,197 6,062
164 RENO, NV 10,329 79,402 89,731
165 SALT LAKE CITY-OGDEN, UT 69,189 162,876 232,065
166 POCATELLO-IDAHO FALLS, ID 2,266 866 3,132
167 BOISE CITY, ID 3,865 1,752 5,617
168 SPOKANE, WA 41,928 54,736 96,664
169 RICHLAND, WA 55,757 24,740 80,497
!70 YAKIMA, WA 56,548 15,190 71,738
171 SEATTLE, WA 556,373 588,411 1,144,784
172 PORTLAND, OR 373,967 394,191 768,158
1173 E-JGENE, OR 88,817 535 89,352
174 REDDING, CA 67 67 134
176 SAN FRANCISCO-OAKI.AND-SAN JOSE, CA 406,286 648,293 1,054,579
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APPENDIX A
INTERMODAL HUB VOLUMES FOR YEAR 2000
BASED ON COMBINED INTERMODAL, BOXABLE, AND TRAM DIVERSION FEUS
DATA SOURCES: ICC CARLOAD WAYBILL SAMPLE WITH ASSUMED 4 PERCENT
ANNUAL GROWTH AND TRAM TRUCK DIVERSIONS
FEUS FEUS TOTAL FEU
BEA NUMBER AND NAME ORIGINATED TERMINATED VOLUME
177 SACRAMENTO, CA 124,782 72,256 197,038
178 STOCKTON-MODESTO, CA 282,371 113,880 396,251
179 FRESNO-BAKERSFIELD, CA 203,575 59,974 263,549
180 LOS ANGELES, CA 1,810,753 1,553,448 3,364,201
181 SAN DIEGO, CA 7,273 5,011 12,284
185 MARITIMES 3,797 0 3,797
186 QUEBEC 95,344 0 95,344
187 ONTARIO 41,562 18,321 59,883
188 MANITOBA 2,499 0 2,499
189 SASKATCHEWAN 333 0 333
190 ALBERTA 6,394 0 6,394
191 BRITISH COLUMBIA 19,851 5,529 25,380
192 PUERTO RICO 733 0 733
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APPENDIX B
Atlanta Chica go Oallas
Rail Highway A/" Rail Highway R/H Rail Highway /IAtlanta Atlanta 134 614 1.03 Atlanta 025 195 1.04
Baltimore 616 645 1.05 Isltirore 136 668 1.19 altimre 1448 1356 1.01
Boston 1011 1031 1.05 Boston 1010 363 1.06 Boston 164 1148 1.01ChicIgo 134 614 1.09 Chicago Chicago 968 911 1.06Cleveland 150 612 1.12 Cleveland 340 335 1.01 Cleveland 1234 1159 1.06
Dallas 825 195 1.04 Dallas 968 911 1.06 Dallis
Denver 1526 1391 1.09 Denver 1026 996 1.03 Denver 835 111 1.01Detroit 141 691 1.01 Detroit 212 266 1.02 Detroit 1200 1143 1.05
Houston 856 189 1.08 Houston 1205 1061 1.13 Houston 264 243 1.0Indianapolis 585 493 1.13 Indianapolis 184 181 1.02 Indianapolis 351 865 1.10
Jacksonville 350 306 1.14 Jacksonville 1083 980 1.11 Jacksonville 1036 990 1.11
11nSIS City 890 198 1.12 kansis City 451 499 0.90 lansis City 511 481 1.06Los Angeles 2285 2112 1.05 Los Angeles 2221 2054 1.08 Los Angeles 1460 1381 1.05
onaphis 420 311 1.13 Hemphis 521 530 0.99 %ev his 481 452 1.06Miami 116 655 1.09 Miami 1149 132 1.09 Miami 1462 1300 1.1?New Orleans 493 419 1.03 New Orleans 921 912 1.01 New Orleans 506 496 1.02
New York 862 81 1.02 New York 308 802 1.11 Mew York 1635 155? 1.05Philadelphia 111 141 1.04 Philadelphia 816 138 1.11 Philadelphia 1543 1152 1.06Pittsburgh 806 68 1.11 Pittsbr (468 451 1.04 Pittsburgh 1231 1201 1.01St Louis 612 541 1.13 St Louis 214 89 0.38 St Louis I11 630 1.13
St Paul 1130 1063 1.06 St Paul 336 395 1.00 St Paul 391 938 1.06San Francisco 2111 2496 1.09 Sar, Francisco 4?63 214? 1.06 San Francisco 1930 1153 1.10Seattle 2824 2618 1.08 Seattle 2141 2013 1.06 Seattle 2334 2018 1.15AVAGA RAIL CIRLIIT 1.088 1.053 1.015
Jacksonville kansas City Los Angeles
Rail Iliglivy AIN Pal Hig iwy P/H Rail Highway R/HAtlanta 350 306 1.14 Atlanta 890 138 1.1? Atlanta 2285 2182 1.05
Biltimore 194 163 1.04 Baltimore 1198 1043 1,11 Saltimore 2308 2636 1.10Boston 1210 1155 1.05 Boston 1469 1391 1.06 Boston 3244 2919 1.03
Chicago 1083 980 1.11 Chicago 451 493 0.90 Chicago 2221 2054 1.08
Cleveland 1100 315 1.20 Cleveland 1 I 113 1.02 Cleveland 2555 2361 1.08
Dallis 1096 990 1.11 Dallas 511 489 1.06 Dallas 1460 1381 1.05
Denver 1811 1104 1.06 Denver 636 600 1.06 Denver 1353 1059 1.2
Detroit 1098 1003 1.09 Detroit 123 143 0.31 Detroit 2439 2311 1.08Houston 915 383 1.10 Houston 181 110 1.10 Houston 1641 1538 1.01Indianapolis 935 13 1.11 Indianapolis 518 435 I.01 Indianapolis 2212 2013 1.10
JAcisonville Jacksonville 1115 1104 1.06 Jacksonville 2518 2311 1.08kansis City 1115 1104 1.06 sansis City Kansas City I116 1519 1.1?
lo& Angeles 2511 2311 1.08 Los Angeles 1116 1589 1.12 Los Angeles
Memphis 631 614 1.03 Memphis 484 451 1.01 Meuqais 1142 Ill? 1.01Mimi 366 341 1.05 Mimi 1541 14418 .06 Mimi 2944 2611 1.10New Orleans 612 555 1.10 New Orleans £13 806 1.00 New Orleans 1966 1813 1.04New York 911 959 1.02 New York 1329 1118 1.11 New York 3062 7116 1.11Philadelphia 190 159 '1.04 Philadelphia 1231 Ill 1.11 Philadelphia 2991 2106 I.1Pittsburgh 1052 151 1.24 Pittsburgh 183 I38 106 Pittsburgh 2643 2426 8.13St Louis 911 841 1.08 St Louis 218 251 1.03 St Louis 2032 1845 1.10St Paul 14I1 1361 1.01 St Paul 480 443 1.01 St Paul 2151 114 1.14San Francisco 2389 2143 1.09 Son Francisc 1910 183S 1.01 Sin Francisco 410 313 8.24Seattle 3129 2324 1.01 Seattle 1954 139 1.06 Seattle 1310 1131 1.21
AVIAG RAIL CIIUIIY 1.012 1.066 1.101
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APPENDIX B
Nev Orleons New York Son Francisco
Rail Highway 1/It Rail Highway R/H Poil Highway N/H
Atlanta 491 419 1.03 Atlanta 862 041 1.02 Atlanta 2111 2496 1.09
IaltIeaore 1154 1115 1.03 Ialtaore 181 196 0.95 Baltimore 3059 2196 1.09
Boston 1569 1501 1.04 Boston 229 206 1.11 Boston 3281 3095 1.06
Chicago 921 912 1.01 Chicago 908 802 1.13 Chicago 2263 2142 1.06
Cleveland 1096 1030 1.06 Cleveland 511 413 1.21 Cleveland 2603 2461 1.06
Dallas 506 496 1.0? Dallas 135 155? 1.05 Dallas 1930 1153 1.10
Denver 1341 1213 1.05 Denver 1934 till 1.09 Denver 1314 1235 1.11
Detroit 1094 1045 1.05 Detroit 6418 631 1.02 Detroit 2535 2399 1.06
Houston 363 356 1.02 Houston 1103 1608 1.06 Houston 2111 1912 1.10
Indianapolis 858 196 1.08 Indianapolis o11 113 1.14 Indianapolis 2429 2256 .01
Jacksonville 612 555 1.10 Jacksonville 981 951 1.02 Jacksonville 2919 2143 1.09
lansas City 813 806 1.08 kansas City 1379 1198 1.11 kansas City 1910 iBls 1.01
Los Angeles 1966 1883 1.04 Los Angeles 3082 2186 1.11 Los Angeles 410 319 1.24
hemphis 394 - 390 1.01 Memph i s 1153 1100 1.05 Memphis 2298 2125 1.08
Miami 918 856 1.14 Himi 1341 1301 1.03 Miai 3355 3053 1.10
New Orleans New Orleans 1355 1311 1.03 New Orleans 2436 2249 1.08
N, York 1355 1311 1.03 New York ke, York 3111 2934 1.08
Philadelphia 1264 1211 1.04 Philadelphia 91 100 0Al Philadelphia 3019 2866 1.01
Pittsburgh 1152 1010 1.08 Pittsburgh 439 368 1.19 Pittsburgh 2131 2518 106
St Louis 699 673 1.04 St tous 1051 9418 1.11 St Louis 2189 2089 1.05
St Paul 1273 1709 1 05 St Paul 1304 11l 1.09 St Paul 2123 il45 1.01
San Francisco 2436 2249 1.08 San francisco 3111 2934 1.08 San Francisco
Seattle 2900 2514 1.13 Seattle 2139 2815 0 9, Seattle 900 808 1.11
AVIRA(1 RAIL CIR(JIIY 1.056 1.068 1.088
Seattle
Rail Highway P/H
Atlanta 2824 2618 I 06
Baltimore 2931 2681 1.10
Boston 3159 2916 1.06
Chicago 2141 2013 1.06
Cleveland 2481 2141 1.06
Dallas 23?4 2018 1.15
(Oenver 1554 1301 1.19
Detroit 2413 2219 1.06
Houston 2656 2214 1.11
Indianapolis 2325 2191 1.06
Jacksonyille 31(5 2924 1.01
kansas City 1954 1839 1.06
Los Angeles 1310 1131 1.21
Memphis 2438 2290 1.06
Miami 3495 3213 1.01
Nee Orleans 2900 2514 1.13
New York 3049 2815 1.08
Philadelphia 2951 2151 1.01
Pittsburgh 2610 2465 1.06
St touls 2213 201 1.06
St Paul 145 1618 1.08
San Francisco 900 808 1.11
Spattle
AVULAGE RAIL CIRWIIY 1.094 OVRALL AYIIAG RAIL CIRWITY 1.019
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